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Abstract. Conventional democratic institutions aggregate preferences
poorly. The norm of one-person-one-vote with majority rule treats people
fairly by giving everyone an equal chance to influence outcomes, but fails
to give proportional weight to people whose interests in a social outcome
are stronger than those of other people—a problem that leads to the
familiar phenomenon of tyranny of the majority. Various institutions that
have been tried or proposed over the years to correct this problem—
including supermajority rule, weighted voting, cumulative voting, “mixed
constitutions,” executive discretion, and judicially protected rights—all
badly misfire in various ways, for example, by creating gridlock or
corruption. This paper proposes a new form of political decision-making
based on the theory of quadratic voting. It explains how quadratic voting
solves the preference aggregation problem by giving proper weight to
preferences of varying intensity, how it can be incorporated into political
institutions, and why it should improve equity.
Introduction
Groups frequently make collective decisions through majority rule.
Legislators pass bills by majority; shareholders make most corporate decisions by
(share-weighted) majority rule, as do directors; clubs, university faculties, and
civic associations typically use majority rule as well. The reason that they do so is
not entirely clear. Majority rule seems fair—and certainly fairer than rule by one
(dictatorship) or a minority—but it is not obviously fairer than rule by unanimity
or consensus, or rule by a supermajority like two-thirds. Majority rule has some
useful properties but it often fails to advance the good of the group.
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The basic problem with majority rule is well-known: majorities can
disregard the legitimate interests of minorities. Imagine, for example, that a
community is trying to decide whether to devote funds collected from taxes to
build a park. A large minority, including elderly people and families with young
children, would benefit greatly from a park; a bare majority doesn’t have strong
views but on balance doesn’t want to spend the money. The majority can block
the park even if the minority gains more from the park than the majority loses:
there is no mechanism for ensuring that the majority takes into account the
minority’s disproportionate interests. For example, if the minority consists of
10,000 people who value the park at $100 each, and the majority consists of
11,000 people who disvalue the park at $2 each, the majority prevails even though
the park generates a net social product of $978,000. More troublesome examples
are easy to imagine and occur throughout history. In politics, majority rule—
unrestricted by constitutional protections—permits the majority to expropriate the
property of the minority, throw them in jail, and deprive them of the franchise.
Even when the majority respects basic rights, it may deprive minorities of benefits
and privileges that are available to others. The most prominent example from
recent years, which we discuss in some numerical detail below, is the claim that
the majority of Americans in various states unfairly deny the legal benefits of
marriage to same-sex couples.
The possibility that the majority may disregard the interests of the
minority has a well-known label: it is “tyranny of the majority.” 2 But what is
wrong with tyranny of the majority? One could argue that tyranny of the majority
is just a negative label for “democracy,” a label wielded by special interests,
privileged groups, and others who fear majority rule. If all citizens are equal, what
could be fairer than allowing the majority of them to determine policy, either
directly or through representatives? 3
2

The concept of tyranny of the majority is as old as majority rule, as will be discussed; early users
of the phrase include John Adams, Alexis de Tocqueville, who popularized it, and John Stuart
Mill, among others. John Adams, A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United
States of America, Vol. 3, reprinted in The Works of John Adams 6 (Charles Francis Adams ed.
1851) (1788); Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Arthur Goldhammer trans., Penguin
Putnam 2004) (1835); John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., Yale
University Press 2003) (1859). Many formulations of it exist, of course, e.g.: Thomas Paine,
Dissertations on Government; the Affairs of the Bank; and Paper Money (1786) (“despotism may
be more effectually acted by many over a few than by one man over all”).
3
A number of theorems illustrate the attractive features of majority rule but show that it achieves
good social outcomes only under narrow conditions. See, e.g., Howard R. Bowen, The
Interpretation of Voting in the Allocation of Economic Resources, 27 Q. J. Econ. 58 (1943);
Kenneth O. May, A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority
Decisions, 20 Econometrica 680 (1952); Douglas W. Rae, Decision-Rules and Individual Values
in Constitutional Choice, 63 Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 40 (1969); Michael J. Taylor, Proof of a
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But there are good reasons to be worried about tyranny of the majority.
The first reason is that, as noted, majority rule, unless constrained to prevent
tyranny of the majority, will not necessarily advance the public good. Majority
rule can lead to the systematic transfer of wealth or resources from a minority to
the majority. From the standpoint of the public interest, such systematic transfers
are sometimes justified (for example, transfers from rich to poor), but they need
not be, and nothing about majority rule guarantees that such transfers will
promote public well-being. The transfers may go from one morally arbitrary
group to another—for example, election winners to election losers, or poorer
people to wealthier people, or black people to white people. Often these transfers
incur substantial waste both administratively and in separating goods from the
owners that most value them. 4 Moreover, because the harm from being trapped in
a minority is so great, people will struggle to form coalitions that constitute a
majority—a high-stakes game that consumes time and resources that could be
more productively spent elsewhere.
There are actually two distinct problems here that are often merged
together. In the United States, tyranny of the majority usually refers to the
systematic and repeated use of the political process by a relatively stable majority
(such as white people) to pass legislation that benefits it at the expense of a
“discrete and insular” minority (such as black people). 5 It is sometimes thought
that majority rule is less troublesome when groups “take turns” playing a role in
the majority. For example, if whites and Latinos outvote African-Americans on a
bill proposed this year, but then African-Americans have a chance to form a
coalition with Latinos to outvote whites next year, and so on, one might believe
that “tyranny of the majority” does not take place. But whatever label one uses,
majority rule is still not optimal. The reason is that if the white-Latino coalition
inefficiently expropriates from African-Americans in year 1 by using inefficient
legislation that reduces public welfare, and the black-Latino coalition does the
Theorem on Majority Rule, 14 Beh. Sci. 228 (1969); Ted C. Bergstrom, When Does Majority
Rule Supply Public Goods Efficiently?, 81 Scand. J. of Econ. 216 (1979). The large literature on
voting rules is surveyed in Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice III (2003); Kenneth A. Shepsle,
Analyzing Politics (2d. ed. 2010); and other volumes. Lurking in the background is Arrow’s
theorem, which proves that under relatively broad conditions, no voting system can produce
outcomes that are both Pareto-efficient and non-dictatorial. Arrow’s theorem assumes ordinal
preferences; the quadratic voting system we discuss below does not.
4
There are countless historical examples of the violent transfer of resources from a minority group
to the majority; the expropriation of assets of Jewish citizens by the Nazi government in Germany
is the canonical example, See Constance Harris, The Way Jews Lived: Five Hundred Years of
Printed Words and Images 328 (2009).
5
See, e.g., Lani Guinier, The Tyranny of the Majority (1994).
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same in year 2, and so on, then majority rule makes possible legislation that
causes social harm even if it is spread out among all groups rather than
concentrated in a single group—social harm that the political process should
avoid if possible. When we use the term “tyranny of the majority,” we mean to
refer to this broader problem with majority rule systems, and not just to the first
case. 6
The second reason for being worried about tyranny of the majority is that
majority rule can short-circuit democracy. If democracy means that members of
the public play a role in governance, majority rule can subvert democracy by
excluding even large minorities from self-governance. The majority can entrench
itself by throwing up hurdles to political participation by minorities—
gerrymandering districts, imposing censorship, raising the cost of political
organization, even disenfranchising the minority. In these ways, temporary
electoral successes can lead to a permanent weakening of democratic institutions.
Recently, tyranny of the majority was the rallying cry of liberal groups in Egypt
during the administration of President Mohamed Morsi before he was overthrown
by the Egyptian army; in Turkey under President Recep Erdoğan; and in Russia
under President Vladimir Putin. In Turkey and Russia, minorities protested but
made no headway; in Egypt, they repudiated democracy because Egyptian
democratic institutions did not protect them. 7
For these reasons, both philosophers and practical politicians have sought
limits on majority rule so as to minimize or eliminate its negative consequences.
For the purpose of this paper, we will ignore one extreme—autocracy or
dictatorship—which has the obvious defect that it enables the ruler to exploit the
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For example, suppose that proposed government projects routinely produce 100 for A, 100 for B,
and -300 for C. Even if over time, different people or groups take turns playing the role of A or B
or C, a system of majority rule that approved all of these projects would gradually impoverish
everyone even if it did not single out any particular individuals or groups for particularly
burdensome treatment. The legal literature on judicial review (discussed below) largely ignores
this problem, and focuses instead on settings where the same group always is forced to take the
role of C.
7
See Michael Kelley, Egypt Is Falling Apart On The Anniversary Of The Revolution, Bus. Insider
(Jan. 25, 2013, 12:52 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/egypt-on-the-anniversary-of-itsrevolution-2013-1; E.J. Dionne, Obama Embraces Democratic Realism Abroad, CHI. TRIB. (Dec.
13,
2011)
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-12-13/news/ct-oped-1213-dionne20111213_1_human-rights-foreign-policy-state-hillary-rodham-clinton; Laurence Norman & Joe
Parkinson, Erdogan Aims to Ease EU Concerns, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 21, 2014, 4:24 PM),
http://stream.wsj.com/story/latest-headlines/SS-2-63399/SS-2-431363/.
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majority, and not just the minority. 8 But many other institutional arrangements are
consistent with the spirit behind majority rule—the idea that the population
should govern itself both because self-governance leads to good outcomes and
because self-governance is required by fairness or democracy. These
arrangements include supermajority rules, bicameralism and separation of powers,
weighted voting, judicial review, representational democracy, and much else.
Unfortunately, they all have significant problems, indeed, basically the same
problem: they either give insufficient power to minorities, allowing tyranny of the
majority, or they give excessive power to minorities, which leads to gridlock as
well as unfair political outcomes. No existing system calibrates the power
afforded to minorities to the strength of their interests in a given policy decision.
A new type of voting system, however, offers a solution. Under quadratic
voting (QV), everyone votes on proposals (in the case of referenda) or candidates
by buying as many votes pro or con as they want. The price they pay is the square
of the number of votes they buy. The amount collected is redistributed back to the
voters on a pro rata basis. As shown by one of us, 9 QV guarantees outcomes that
maximize social welfare. It avoids tyranny of the majority by giving the minority
the ability to buy extra votes, but because the minority must pay a price per vote
proportional to the votes they purchase, it does not allow the minority to extract
unfair outcomes or cause gridlock.
We realize that some readers will not take seriously a political voting
system that allows people to buy votes. There is a strong taboo against votebuying, and one may worry that such a system will benefit the rich at the expense
of the poor. However, we will show that the taboo reflects the harmful effects of
money in an ordinary political system, such as one-person-one-vote majority rule,
and the logic of the taboo does not apply to QV. Moreover, we will show that QV
would improve the equity of voting outcomes compared to the status quo.
The first part of this paper sets the stage for quadratic voting by providing
a brief survey of efforts to develop voting and related mechanisms to solve the
problem of tyranny of the majority, or, more specifically, ensure that governments
make decisions that advance the public good rather than wastefully shift around
resources among interest groups. We show how all approaches have significant
difficulties, which explains why democracy remains the “worst form of
8

However, dictatorships usually are supported by powerful minorities, which believe that they
would do worse under a system of majority rule. See Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson,
Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (2006).
9
See E. Glen Weyl, Quadratic Vote Buying (April 1, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2003531.
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government except all those other forms that have been tried,” in Winston
Churchill’s words. 10 The second part of this paper explains how QV works, how
it can be applied to democratic politics, and why it is superior to other voting
systems.
I. The Problem of Intense Preferences in Democracy
A. Ancient Times
The earliest examples of institutionalized majority rule come from
Homeric, German, and Spartan assemblies, where the group expresses its
preference by acclamation, with the presiding officer declaring the outcome. 11
Rule by acclamation (rather than ballot) may have been convenient for an
illiterate population (though the use of ballots does not require literacy), but an
interesting, and apparently intentional, feature of it is that it permits people to
express the intensity of their preferences by shouting or murmuring. An intense
minority could thus outshout a waffling majority, at least as long as the minority
is not too small. The aggregate level of sound in this way reflects both the number
of voters and the intensity of their preferences. To be sure, people could act
strategically by shouting when they did not have strong opinions, but the publicity
of the act and the risk of being seen as a strategic actor may have limited the value
of this option.
The purest form of democracy known to history was the Athenian
democracy of the 5th century B.C. Most government power was held by the
Assembly, which consisted of all (adult male) citizens regardless of their social
status or property holdings. Although magistrates, boards, councils, courts and
other offices and institutions existed, their power was subordinate to that of the
Assembly. The Assembly could pass laws, issue decrees affecting individuals,
and punish political leaders with ostracism and other sanctions, including death.
Every member of the Assembly had one vote, and majority rule prevailed.
But the Athenians were well-aware of the dangers of majority rule. In one
famous incident during the Peloponnesian War, 12 the Assembly tried and
10

Winston Churchill, 444 Parl. Deb., H.C. (5th ser.) 207 (1947).
John Gilbert Heinberg, History of the Majority Principle, 20 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 52, 55 (1926).
In Sparta, “The loudness of the cry was judged by men shut up in a house near the Apella, from
which they could hear the cry, but could not see the assembly.” Id. See also Melissa Schwartzberg,
Counting the Many: The Origins and Limits of Supermajority Rule 21-25 (2013) (discussing
acclamation systems).
12
Xenophon, Hellencia, Book 1 (G. Bell and Sons 1897).
11
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condemned to death a group of generals for failing to rescue survivors and
recover the bodies of the dead after a naval victory off the Arginoussai islands;
later, persuaded that a storm prevented the generals from acting, the Assembly
condemned to death the generals’ accusers. 13 The account left to us by Xenophon
depicts an out-of-control mob that, manipulated by demagogues and provoked by
a sympathetic survivor of the disaster, disregarded constitutional norms.
Greek thinkers often disparaged Greek democracy because the masses of
poor could outvote the smaller group of educated people, and could force through
wealth transfers. Plato saw democracy as lawless rule of the mob. 14 Aristotle held
a more favorable view of democracy but similarly believed that because the poor
form the majority, they will rule so as to advance their own interests rather than
the common good. In a famous passage he suggested weighting votes by property
holdings, possibly as a way for reflecting preference intensity. 15 The playwright
Aristophanes satirized democratic decision-making by citing examples of the poor
outvoting the rich on the raising of fleets, which the rich paid for while supplying
the poor with jobs as sailors. 16 In Polybius’ words,
By its violence and contempt of law [democracy] becomes sheer
mob-rule… For the mob, habituated to feed at the expense of
others, and to have its hopes of livelihood in the property of its
neighbor, as soon as it has got a leader sufficiently ambitious and
daring, being excluded by poverty from the sweets of civil honors,
produces a reign of mere violence. Then come tumultuous
assemblies, massacres, banishments, [and] redivisions of land…. 17
After their defeat in the Peloponnesian War, which was blamed in part on
the poor decisions of the majority, Athenians introduced a more moderate form of
democracy. They gave more power to independent bodies, including a
commission that proposed legislation (the Nomothetai), and a People’s Court,
which had the power to strike down decrees of the Assembly that violated the
laws. Since the members of all these bodies were selected by lot, the practical
effect was to require multiple majority votes involving different groups of people,
13

Mogens Herman Hansen, The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes 6 (J.A. Crook
trans., University of Oklahoma Press 1999).
14
Plato, The Apology 31-32, and Plato, The Republic 473, in Plato: The Collected Dialogues
(Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds. & Hugh Tredennick trans., 1987).
15
See Aristotle, Politics, Book 6, Part III (Benjamin Jowett trans., Paul Negri & John Berseth eds.,
2000).
16
Hansen, supra note at 8.
17
Polybius,
The
Histories,
Perseus
Digital
Library,
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0234.
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which amounted to an implicit supermajority requirement (except in rare cases
where the median voter in both bodies had the same political preference).
Members of the Court were required to be over thirty years old, unlike members
of the Assembly, and were required to take oaths to uphold the law; these
requirements would also have ensured that the bodies differed in ideological
composition. Other procedural innovations—like requiring the Assembly to hold
two meetings for approval of treaties and other decrees—also weakened the hand
of the majority by forcing it to sustain itself over a period of time. 18 Yet these
procedures also led to gridlock, the great risk of supermajority rule, as we will
discuss shortly. 19
Another way to protect the interests of the minority in a majority-rule
system is to give power to the agenda-setter or presiding officer. In ancient
Athens and especially Rome, magistrates could sometimes thwart the will of the
majority, especially when the majority was subject to a fleeting passion, by
announcing that the gods disapproved of the voting date, or by manipulating the
order of the voting. 20 Both polities also gave discretion to magistrates, and they
could use that discretion to advance the common good when their activities could
not be observed and checked by the people. But giving discretion to government
officials creates a new problem, which is that they use their powers to advance
their own personal interests, or the interests of favored families, clans, or other
groups.
The more significant development was the theory of the mixed
constitution, which was famously advocated by Polybius. 21 A mixed constitution
is one in which different social groups—typically, the masses, the aristocracy, and
a hereditary ruler—are given influence over governance. The mixed constitution
ensured that any group could veto political outcomes that it disapproved of. In the
Roman Republic, for example, the Senate was dominated by aristocrats, while
certain important offices were reserved for plebeians. Assemblies gave ordinary
people a voice by virtue of their number, but electoral procedures gave
advantages to voters with greater wealth. 22

18

Hansen, supra note, at 307.
Id. at 308.
20
See J.A. North, Democratic Politics in Republican Rome 126 Past & Present 3, 17 (1990),
available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/650807 (“Above all, they exercised an exclusive control as
magistrates, senators and priests over the ceremonial of public religious activity, and hence over
access to the gods and to divine legitimation of all human activities.”).
21
Polybius, supra note; see also Aristotle, Politics, Book 3 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Paul Negri &
John Berseth eds., 2000).
22
Polybius, supra note.
19
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The Roman Republic lasted centuries, and was a spectacular success by
the standards of the time. Its mixed system effectively created supermajority rule
that ensured that ordinary people could influence government policy but not
expropriate the property of smaller groups, including the wealthy, which limited
conflict and civil war for many centuries. 23 But the large number of veto points
led to gridlock, which powerful rulers from time to time resolved with extraconstitutional acts, leading eventually to civil war, dictatorship, and then
empire. 24
B. The Modern Period
1. The Attractions of Supermajority Rule
The next step in the development of voting systems took place in Italian
communes in the Middle Ages. These communes used supermajority rules to elect
their leaders—sometimes unanimity, but usually 2/3 or some other fraction
considerably larger than the majority. 25 In the Church, canon law provided that
many decisions would be made by majority rule, but a complicated set of laws
permitted outvoted minorities to appeal to higher officials and prevail if they
could persuade those officials that the majority vote was contaminated in some
way—by the personal interests or motives of voters in the majority, or simply
because it was wrong. 26 Under the doctrine of maior et sanior pars, a minority
could outvote a majority if the minority contained people with superior judgment,
such as those with greater experience and wisdom—a form of weighted voting
that we will discuss later. 27 In England, the House of Commons began to use
majority rule in the fifteenth century, but Great Britain had a classic mixed
Constitution—with the aristocracy able to exert power through the House of
Lords, and the King able to act on his own—so that in practice political outcomes
must have satisfied an implicit supermajority rule (putting aside Cromwell’s
dictatorship).

23

See Schwartzberg, supra note, at 39-46.
See Eric A. Posner, The Constitution of the Roman Republic: A Political Economy Perspective
(U of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 540; U of Chicago, Public Law &
Legal Theory Working Paper No. 327), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1701981.
25
Heinberg, supra note at 58; Arthur M. Wolfson, The Ballot and Other Forms of Voting in Italian
Communes, 5 Am. Hist. Rev. 3 (1899). Supermajorities rules also existed in ancient times—and
effectively in Rome as note above—but become more explicit in this period. See Schwartzberg,
supra note, at 44-46, 49-51.
26
Heinberg, supra note at 59-60.
27
John Gilbert Heinberg, Theories of Majority Rule, 26 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 452, 456 (1932);
Schwartzberg, supra note, at 52-58.
24
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What accounted for the growing popularity of supermajority rule? A
plausible answer is that supermajority rule allows the majority to govern while
giving some protection to people with intense interests when they are unable to
form a majority coalition. Supermajority rules protect minorities, and thus they
enable people with intense preferences to block acts that harm them if they form a
large enough minority or can form a large enough minority coalition with other
interests. Supermajority rule may thus seem like an improvement over majority
rule. 28 One can thus speculate that supermajority rules appealed to political
leaders, constitutional founders, and the general public for two reasons. First,
people in the majority today know that they may be in the minority tomorrow.
They give up the chance of prevailing by a weak majority in return for gaining the
ability to block weak majorities—a tradeoff that may reduce the risk of purely
redistributive but inefficient outcomes that favor one group sometimes and
another group at other times, thus giving no one a net gain, while reducing total
wealth over time. Second, people with intense preferences who repeatedly are
victimized in the political process have strong incentives to rebel or secede;
supermajority rule institutionalizes their power so that it flows through peaceful
political channels. 29
Stronger rules—like rule by unanimity or consensus—also can block
tyranny of the majority, but they suffer from a significant disadvantage: they
cause gridlock. The advantage of unanimity rule is that projects are possible only
if they benefit all members of the group. The disadvantage is that any individual
can hold out, preventing a project from being approved unless she receives a
payoff from other members of the group. Since other individuals face the same
incentives, everyone can hold out, resulting in impasse and failure. 30 This is why
unanimity rule is rarely used in political groups. When it is used, it supports only
the thinnest forms of cooperation. International institutions frequently use
unanimity rule or variations of it. Action by the Security Council requires
unanimity among the five permanent members. The Law of the Sea Authority
also uses supermajority rule and vetoes to protect the largest countries. 31 Because
of mutual suspicion between governments, the risk of decisions that benefit some
states at the expense of others is considered intolerable. This risk is minimized
28

See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 Tex. L.
Rev. 703 (2002) who build a constitutional theory around the ideal of supermajority rule.
29
Supermajority rule developed in certain contexts where it favored those in power (at least,
relative to majority rule). See Schwartzberg, supra note, at 59-70. The bias toward the status quo
would clearly benefit those who did well in the status quo.
30
See George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite, Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems
with Many Agents, 57 Rev. Econ. Stud. 351 (1990) for a formalization of this argument.
31
See Eric A. Posner & Alan O. Sykes, Voting Rules in International Institutions, Chicago J.
Inter’l L. (forthcoming 2014).
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with strong decision rules that also cause gridlock, which is considered a
reasonable price to pay. 32
Hold-out is more difficult under supermajority rule than under unanimity
rule, but supermajority rule is more cumbersome than majority rule, as experience
in the U.S. senate shows. The series of recent crises over the debt ceiling show the
hold-out power created even by relatively weak minority protections, which
enable a determined minority to block projects supported by the majority even
when these projects are clearly in the public interest. Furthermore, supermajority
rules do not prevent a “conservative” tyranny of the majority in which legislation
bringing great benefits to a minority (such as civil rights laws for racial or ethnic
minorities, or same-sex marriage for gays and lesbians) is blocked by a majority.
Indeed, supermajority rules discourage minorities from forming coalitions with
each other to advance their interests by raising the size of the coalition needed to
pass new legislation. Still, supermajority rule may be a tolerable compromise—
reducing the worst excesses of tyranny of the majority without shutting down
government altogether. 33
Supermajority rule takes many forms. Sometimes, it is explicit;
sometimes, other voting rules effectively require a supermajority. It can stand
alone or it can be joined with still other rules that protect particular interests. The
U.S. Constitution, drafted by men who were intensely aware of the history of
democratic institutions and their problems, contains numerous examples of
supermajority rules. A supermajority of the Senate—two-thirds—must approve a
treaty before a president can ratify it. A supermajority of the Senate is needed to
block a filibuster. Two thirds of each house are necessary to overcome the
president’s veto. These are all explicit examples of supermajority rule. 34 It is
commonly said that one of the purposes of the constitutional drafters was to
protect minorities—for example, the minority of Americans living in the South, or
in rural areas, or creditors, or those with substantial property holdings. A better
way of putting this point is that the founders realized that these groups had intense
32

Majority rule exists in bodies like the General Assembly and the UN Human Rights Council,
which lack the authority to make law, and international judicial bodies, which generally gain
jurisdiction only with the consent of affected states. See id.
33
See James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of
Constitutional Democracy (1962). But see Anthony J. McGann, The Tyranny of the
Supermajority: How Majority Rule Protects Minorities, 16 J. Theoretical Pol. 53 (2004) (arguing
that supermajority rule provides less protection to minorities than majority rule does because it
makes it difficult for minorities to form coalitions with other minorities to advance their interests
through new legislation).
34
John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good Constitution (2013)
(describing supermajority rules in the Constitution).
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interests but because they were minorities, could not depend on majority rule to
protect them. Supermajority rule was thus necessary to provide such protection
because a constitutional order would not survive without the support of these
groups.
Another example is bicameralism. At first sight, the requirement of a
majority in both houses in order to pass a bill may seem like a (double) example
of majority rule rather than supermajority rule. But a simple majority in the House
and a simple majority in the Senate will normally be possible only if a
supermajority of Americans approve the policy. The reason is that different
groups of people elect representatives and senators. Except under unusual
conditions, the median voter of one group and the median voter of another group
will be different, which means that a supermajority of one group or the other will
be necessary to approve the bill. 35 And then because the president can veto a bill,
and courts can strike it down, the U.S. Constitution builds in additional points
where minorities may be able to block legislation—if the minority manages to
elect the president (which is difficult but not impossible) or exerts influence over
the judiciary or elements of it (which can occur when a long dominant party that
has made many judicial appointments finally loses power). And then again the
federal system can protect a national minority that dominates a state from
legislation that the national government might like to impose on the state but
cannot because authority to legislate for that policy area lies with the state. Today,
a temporary political majority—even one that captures the presidency and both
houses—must contend not only with the courts, but also with an entrenched
bureaucracy, which can block popular legislation that it disapproves of, or water
down its effect. 36 Even dictatorship, oligarchy, and aristocracy can be systems
designed to protect minority interests. Oligarchy classically protects the interests
of the wealthy minority; aristocracy protects the interests of ancient families or
other groups with historical privileges. Dictatorships often rest on the support of
powerful minorities that fear rule of the majority—for example, the Sunnis in Iraq
under Saddam Hussein (where the majority consists of Shiites), and the Christians
and Alawites in Syria under Hafez and Bashar al-Assad (where the majority
consists of Sunnis).

35
See John J. Coleman, Unified Government, Divided Government, and Party Responsiveness, 93
Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 821 (1999).
36
Various other rules, some in the Constitution, others customary, protect minority interests. An
interesting class of such rules are “submajority” voting rules, which give minorities extra power to
protect themselves by giving them some control over the agenda. See Adrian Vermeule,
Mechanisms of Democracy 85-115 (2007).
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Constitutional systems can also protect minority interests by giving them
more votes. The U.S. Constitution did just that by giving slave-holding states
extra representation in the House based on the number of slaves in their
populations—the notorious 3/5 rule. 37 This rule protected states with intense
minority interests (in the preservation of slavery) from the weaker interests (in the
abolition of slavery) of a majority of states. The rule that states elect two senators
regardless of the size of their population can also be understood as one that gives
greater voting power to people in low-population states, thus again protecting
intense minority interests. Similar rules can be found in corporate governance
today. Shareholders with larger stakes in a corporation have more votes than
shareholders with smaller stakes—voting is typically based on number of shares
owned rather than status as a shareholder. Voting systems in international
organizations like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund also give
more weight to countries that contribute the most money to those organizations,
thus protecting their contributions from expropriation by the poorer countries that
form the majority of their membership. 38
John Stuart Mill argued that educated people should be given more votes
than uneducated people because educated people understand the public good
better than uneducated people do. 39 Others have advocated property qualifications
over the years based on similar reasoning: people with property have more at
stake in political choices, and therefore should have greater voting power. 40
37
Or, looked at differently, it gives greater weight to northern states given that 2/5 of the slave
population in southern states were not counted. In other words, if the baseline is that the South
should have voting power in the national government that is commensurate to its fraction of the
total national population, the rule gives extra voting power to the North; if the baseline is that the
South should have voting power in the national government that is commensurate to its fraction of
the national voting population (thus excluding slaves), the rule gives extra voting power to the
South.
38
Yet another example is consociationalism, a constitutional form where different groups (for
example, different religious or ethnic groups) are guaranteed proportional representation in
government, including in the executive, and decisions are usually made by consensus. Examples
include Lebanon and Bosnia and Herzegovina. John Calhoun advocated a type of
consociationalism when he argued that the United States should have a dual executive consisting
of a Northern and Southern representative. See Arend Lijphart, Consociational Democracy, 21
World Pol. 207 (1969).
39
See John Stuart Mill, Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform (1859), reprinted in The Collected
Works of John Stuart Mill, 19 (John M. Robson ed., 1977). In common with modern approaches
as well as empirical evidence, we assume that people vote in their self-interest, and hence the
voting system must be designed so as to aggregate information and preferences. However, strong
empirical evidence suggests that the educated typically have more intense information and
preferences and thus might optimally receive, on average, a greater weight. See Raymond E.
Wolfinger & Steven J. Rosenstone, Who Votes? (1980).
40
Property qualifications for voting were common in the states at the time of the founding.
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Similar reasoning justified the denial of the franchise to women, who were
thought to lack the judgment to make political decisions and were otherwise
protected by the votes of their fathers or husbands, and to the inhabitants of
colonies, who were believed incapable of self-government because they lacked
intelligence or proper traditions. In all these cases, the fear was that the a virtuous
or wise minority with strong interests would be outvoted by ordinary people who,
more numerous than the elites, would have greater voting power under
unweighted majority rule.
Weighted voting is rarely used today in political decisions. The older
justifications are now seen as biased, bigoted, and plain wrong. But, even putting
aside the questionable empirical assumptions of their proponents, weighted voting
is not a good way for protecting minority interests. 41 The problem is that people
with extra votes can use those votes to advance their interests even when those
interests are weak and they are affected less by a policy than others. The problem
is familiar in corporate governance: people who own multiple shares of a
corporation and therefore enjoy commensurate voting power that they can use to
protect their interests, can also use this same voting power to expropriate value
from other shareholders. 42 For example, a person who owns 51 percent of a
corporation can in theory push through a merger that benefits her because she
owns the target company and can insist on an above-market price, in the process
harming the owners of the other 49 percent. The courts try to deter this kind of
expropriation by giving minorities the right to challenge the merger in court and
obtain a fair valuation. 43 But then judges must determine the value of the
corporation—a hard thing to do, and in tension with the idea that corporations
should be private in the first place.
Moreover, all major democratic systems are representative democracies,
not popular democracies, and representative democracy protects minority interests
to a greater extent than popular democracy does. Representatives may themselves
understand the dangers of acceding to majority interests too easily; they may also
be more responsive to well-organized minorities, which can contribute cash, than
to the majority, which may have difficulty coordinating and enforcing its
interests. The founders gave senators six-year terms in order to insulate them from
public opinion and enable them to check the more democratically sensitive House.
41
As advocated by Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (1990) (arguing that
women should have a veto over issues that affect them).
42
See Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Quadratic Voting as Efficient Corporate Governance, U.
Chicago L. Rev. (forthcoming 2014).
43
See Reis v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 28 A.3d 442 (Del. Ch. 2011) (holding that a
corporation “must pay ‘in cash’ an amount equal to the ‘fair value’ of the fractional interests.”).
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The framers of the U.S. constitution recognized the dangers of majority
rule. During the period of the Articles of Confederation, state governments broke
contracts, redistributed wealth, and engaged in other policies that benefited the
majority at the expense of the propertied minority. 44 Aware also of the repeated
attempts by Roman political leaders like the Gracchi and Caesar to obtain power
by promising to redistribute wealth to the masses, the framers implemented
numerous anti-majoritarian rules in the Constitution. These included several
mentioned above: the separation of government powers into three branches that
exercised partial vetoes and drew their power from different constituencies; the
further division of the legislature into an upper and lower house; numerous
provisions for the indirect election of powerful figures including the president and
senators; the appointment of others, such as judges; explicit supermajority voting
rules; federalism; extreme supermajority rules for amending the Constitution; and
so on. 45 These rules did not just protect propertied interests from majority rule.
They also protected sectional interests—particularly, those of merchants and slave
owners.
Some commentators celebrate this system of supermajoritarianism, 46 but
there is very little reason to believe that it is optimal or even close to optimal. For
one thing, even if rule by supermajority is superior to rule by majority, the range
of supermajority rules between majority and unanimity is infinite; no one has any
idea whether the optimal supermajority rule is 51 percent or 99 percent or
anywhere in between—and the optimal rule could vary for different areas of
policy, and over time in response to demographic changes. 47 And then it is
possible (if decision costs and hence the risk of gridlock is high enough) that pure
majority rule, or even submajority rule, is better than supermajority rule.
Whatever the merits of supermajority rule, it is clearly a very crude way to protect
minority interests since a particular minority may not have enough votes even
under supermajority rule to block adverse legislation, while another minority may
have enough votes to block legislation that benefits the public interest and does
not harm the minority or does so very little. 48 A minority of 32 percent cannot
44

See, e.g., Calvin H. Johnson, Righteous Anger at the Wicked States: The Meaning of the
Founders’ Constitution (2005); Jack N. Rakove, The Beginnings of National Politics: An
Interpretive History of the Continental Congress (1979); and Woody Holton, Unruly Americans
and the Origins of the Constitution (2007).
45
See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights and Votes, 121 Yale L.J. 1286, 1293-97 (2012).
46
Notably, McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note.
47
Rosalind Dixon & Richard Holden, Constitutional Amendment Rules: The Denominator
Problem, in Comparative Constitutional Design (Tom Ginsburg ed., 2012).
48
See McGann, supra note (arguing that supermajority rule can hurt minorities by raising the costs
of forming coalitions with other minorities in order to overturn laws passed by majorities).
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protect itself under a 2/3 rule, and a minority of 34 percent can threaten to block
legislation that benefits the public unless given a payoff.
Thus, for all its popularity, supermajority rule is fundamentally flawed. It
protects intense minority interests only when those interests are held by enough
people to form a blocking minority. It enables minorities with weak (or strong)
interests to block laws that benefit the majority more than it harms the minority—
creating gridlock. And it does not help people with strong interests when the
status quo harms them; indeed, it hurts them by making it more difficult for them
to cobble together a large enough majority with other groups in order to change
the status quo.
All of these problems influenced the development of American
constitutional law. In response to the problem of gridlock, over a long period the
U.S. constitutional system adjusted itself by shifting power away from the states,
and to the national government; and, within the national government, away from
Congress and to a large bureaucracy controlled by the executive. 49 Gridlock
nonetheless remains a significant problem today.
The problem of the status quo harming minorities with intense interests
created even greater difficulties. Racial, ethnic, and religious minorities both
suffered from discrimination in day-to-day life, and could not obtain legislative
relief because they were outvoted; in many cases, particularly that of AfricanAmericans, voters in the majority at the state level supported laws that weakened
or eliminated the franchise of the minority. When African-Americans finally
joined with northern whites to form majority coalitions at the national level in the
1940s and 1950s, supermajority rules protected the rights of another minority—
southern whites—at their expense, as southern senators used the filibuster to
defeat civil rights legislation that enjoyed majority support among the public. 50
Supermajority rules in this case entrenched a conservative minority, blocking
reforms that would tremendously benefit a smaller minority.
2. Judicial Review of Legislation
In the second half of the twentieth century, federal courts stepped in to
rectify the problem of tyrannical conservative majorities (or large minorities) by
recognizing the rights of minorities to effective political representation. This
49

See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian
Republic (2010) (discussing the rise of executive power).
50
Robert A. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Passage of Power (2012) (describing the
battles over civil rights legislation).
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would turn out to be the greatest contribution of American legal and political
thought to the problems of majority rule. Of course, the original constitution used
the language of rights, but the constitution was not oriented toward the problem of
minority racial and ethnic groups, and even if religious rights appeared in the first
amendment, it was not clearly understood from the beginning that the courts
would have a strong role in preventing the majority from passing laws that harm
minority religious groups. Today, judicial enforcement of the political rights of
politically vulnerable minorities is taken for granted.
The doctrine that courts developed for this purpose is complex; a
simplified description will be adequate here. Laws are presumptively enforceable
because they reflect the will of the majority. But if they burden historically
vulnerable minority groups (or “suspect classes,” an ill-defined concept that at
least includes racial and ethnic groups), then a court will strike them down unless
the government can provide a strong and persuasive reason that the burden is
justified by the public gains. 51 In practice, courts approve such laws only if they
are designed to benefit rather than harm the minority group (affirmative action) 52
or (in the case of religious groups) do not target minority religious practices. 53
This approach is firmly entrenched in American legal thought, with
disputes only along the margins. A small literature objects that the preoccupation
with rights distorts political discourse, but it has exerted little influence. 54
Longstanding worries that judicial review interferes with democratic values,
blocks publicly beneficial legislation, and can lead to backlash, have never gained
a foothold. 55 Conservatives and Republicans originally opposed the extension of
judicially enforced rights to minorities in the 1950s and 1960s, but today accept
the principle that laws with racial classifications are unconstitutional.

51
See, e.g., City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (finding that
permit requirements for a mentally ill nursing home rested on an “irrational prejudice” against
residents).
52
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (holding the special admission program
constitutional for benefitting those based on race).
53
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding the state may deny unemployment
compensation to those who use peyote for religious reasons when the law does not attempt to
regulate freedom of religion).
54
See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse 1-17
(1991). For a discussion and criticism of this view, see Stephen Holmes & Cass R. Sunstein, The
Cost of Rights 158-61 (1999).
55
See, e.g., Jeremey Waldron, Law and Disagreement (1999); Adrian Vermeule, Law and the
Limits of Reason (2008).
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We can see the problems with judicially enforceable rights anew by
considering them from the perspective of the problems with majority rule. Recall
that the major advantage of majority rule is that it facilitates laws and other public
projects that advance the well-being of most of the public (reflected by the
interest of the median voter) by minimizing bargaining costs (relative to
supermajority rule or rule by unanimity or consensus). But the disadvantage is
that it permits majorities to expropriate from minorities, and forces all groups to
expend resources in struggles to avoid exclusion from the majority coalition. At
first sight, judicially enforceable rights seem like an ideal solution. They permit
the majority to continue to legislate for the public good, while prohibiting them
only from passing laws that harm minority interests.
But this argument is too crude. It reaches its conclusion by assuming that
only two kinds of laws exist: those legitimate laws that advance the public interest
without hurting the minority in any way, or perhaps only trivially; and those
illegitimate laws that benefit the majority only through expropriation of minority
interests. However, most laws fall between these two extremes. These laws both
plausibly benefit the majority and also harm a minority.
Consider some familiar examples:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

A gang-loitering or stop-and-frisk law that reduces crime but disrupts the
lives and activities of mostly minority men.
A toughening of visa requirements that reduces illegal immigration but
also disrupts cross-border relationships of immigrants and their foreign
relatives and friends.
An anti-same-sex marriage law like Proposition 8, which reinforces
traditional notions of marriage supported by most Americans but that
deprives gays and lesbians of advantages enjoyed by opposite-sex couples.
Sanitation and anti-drug laws that interfere with religious rituals of
minority religious groups.
Money-tracing laws that restrict money-laundering and terrorist financing
but burden Americans of Arab descent that do business in the Middle East.
Voter identification laws that reduce voting fraud and enhance confidence
in elections but deter voting among the poor.
Zoning laws that enhance public spaces and increase property values but
drive out a small number of low-income residents who cannot afford
higher rents.
Reduction of public funding for inner-city projects (mainly hurting lowincome African-Americans) for the benefit of taxpayers generally.
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•

Eminent domain projects where a city forces the sale of several private
properties, possibly at below value to the owners, in order to build a park
or revitalize the downtown.

People hold different and often strong opinions about these laws but the
laws all pose the same dilemma. A particular law helps (or plausibly helps) the
majority and possibly the public at large, including even the affected minority, or
certain members of it. But the law also puts a burden on the minority, a burden
that may seem unfair and in some cases sufficiently egregious as to throw into
question the desirability of the law in question. The question repeatedly arises, at
what point do the benefits enjoyed by the majority justify the burdens imposed on
the minority?
The Court’s approach is plainly simplistic. Some laws do not explicitly
discriminate against minorities—and might not be motivated by animus—and yet
may impose a burden on minorities that is unfair or excessive. Critics of many of
the laws described above make this argument. A stop-and-frisk law may make
sense in theory, they say; but it puts an excessive burden on minorities. 56 And at
least in theory there may be laws that explicitly burden a minority that may be
publicly justified. The dissenting justices in United States v. Windsor held that
view about the Defense of Marriage Act, which denied federal marriage benefits
to same-sex couples who were legally married under state law. 57 Finally, laws that
explicitly or implicitly discriminate against minority groups which are not suspect
classes because not the subject of historical discrimination may nonetheless be
highly objectionable from a social standpoint because they expropriate benefits
from a group without producing equal social gain. Such laws include those that
discriminate against regional interests (such as farmers or people living in small
towns) or social classes, or any other group that fails to form a majority
coalition—homeowners, or national-park visitors, or commuters, or parents with
young children. 58

56

See The New York Times, Injustices of Stop and Frisk, N.Y. TIMES (May 13. 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/14/opinion/injustices-of-stop-and-frisk.html?_r=0.
57
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
58
An oddity here is that courts rarely try to determine whether a particular group holds political
power on a case by case basis. For example, an ethnic or racial minority may be the majority in a
city that passes an ordinance that is challenged in court, but if the law incorporates racial
classifications that appear to burden that group it will be subject to strict scrutiny. See Dan M.
Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Forward: The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 Geo. L.J.
1153 (1998) (arguing that Supreme Court doctrine that banned overly vague laws used for crime
control but capable of discriminatory enforcement should not be applied when minority groups
support those laws).
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The Court have struggled with these questions, and in recent years the
doctrinal structure has reflected these strains. Two examples illustrate this
problem well. First, in cases challenging laws that burden gays and lesbians, the
Supreme Court has refused to recognize this group as a suspect class, so
technically a discriminatory law is constitutional as long as it is rational, and
under the conventional rules, that would almost always be the case. Yet the Court
has demanded that governments provide substantial evidence that these laws
advance concrete interests—in health or order, for example, rather than purely
moral interests—and governments have had trouble meeting this burden.
However, if the rational basis test ordinarily required persuasive social-science
evidence that a law advances a particular interest, few laws would be
constitutional. Social science evidence is usually extremely weak. The only really
persuasive evidence comes from randomized experiments, but these are costly,
rare, and difficult to generalize from. Observational studies, no matter how high
their quality, are easy to criticize; and usually a consensus will come into place
only after dozens have been performed. As a result, the social-science evidence
that could be cited to support even laws that are widely accepted—say,
imprisonment of burglars, or taxation of polluters—is weak, and when
government embarks on innovative regulatory projects, the evidence will often be
non-existent. Thus, if courts were to demand strong social science evidence for
any law that was challenged, we would not have many laws. That is why the
rational-basis test was used in the first place. The Supreme Court ended up
striking down the Defense of Marriage Act because it believed that opposition to
same-sex marriage reflected “animus” when in fact it reflected moral
disagreement. 59 It seems likely that the real basis of the decision was the
majority’s view that DOMA imposed significant burdens on one group of people
that were not justified by whatever advantages it might have had for others.
Affirmative action provides a second example. Affirmative action laws
typically provide that African-Americans, Latinos, and certain other minority
groups receive special privileges, usually the right to educational and employment
opportunities that are denied to others with superior qualifications. These laws sit
uneasily with the premise that rights protect minorities because the laws
discriminate—more-or-less explicitly—against various minority groups, such as
Asian-Americans, who are routinely denied educational slots for which they are
apparently qualified. While doctrine permits facially discriminatory laws or laws
with explicit racial classifications that serve a “compelling government interest,”
the type of social scientific evidence that courts normally require in these
59

United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (holding that the Defense of Marriage Act was
unconstitutional in part on grounds of improper animus).
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circumstances fails to show that affirmative action benefits the public, 60 and as a
result judicial support for affirmative action, never enthusiastic, has been
waning. 61 Yet affirmative action could be easily seen as a reasonable, pragmatic
policy of the sort that the government regularly experiments with, and justifiably
so.
The basic divide in modern constitutional jurisprudence can be seen from
the standpoint of preference intensity. The liberal justices on the Supreme Court
worry about harms to the strong liberty or dignity interests of racial and ethnic
minorities—African-Americans, Hispanics—and vulnerable groups, like
prisoners, indigent people, political dissidents, and others on the margin of
society. 62 Thus, liberal jurisprudence has centered on the Equal Protection Clause,
the Due Process Clause, the Fourth Amendment, and the First Amendment. 63 The
conservative justices on the Court also worry about majority exploitation—but
they worry about the older type of exploitation that the founders worried about,
namely, the expropriation of property. Indeed, the conservative view that rights
are needed to protect property from expropriation long predates the liberal view
that rights are need to protect the liberty interests of ethnic minorities and other
vulnerable groups. Thus, the conservative justices have focused on strengthening
the Takings Clause of the Constitution, which limits the power of the government
to take property or issue regulations that reduce property values, without paying
compensation. 64 They have also turned the Due Process Clause and the First
Amendment to their advantage, using them to protect businesses against excessive
sanctions and regulation of advertising. 65 Even the recent development of gun

60
Richard H. Sander, A Systematic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 57
Stan. L. Rev. (2004).
61
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (directing lower court to reexamine an
affirmative action program).
62
See John H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1980).
63
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (concluding that the public education doctrine
of “separate but equal” is “inherently unequal” under the Equal Protection Clause.); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that a state criminal abortion statute that excepts only lifesaving
procedures, without regard of other interests or stages of pregnancy, violates the Due Process
Clause); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (finding that a citizen talking in a public
telephone booth had an entitlement to assume privacy under the Fourth Amendment); New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 719 (1971) (arguing that the vagueness of national
security should not “abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment.”).
64
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 715 (2010).
65
BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (finding punitive damages that attempt to deter
activities both in and outside the state are excessive); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)
(finding that restrictions on corporate independent expenditures are invalid under the First
Amendment).
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rights can be seen as protection for a passionate gun-loving minorities. 66 The
liberals and conservatives agree that tyranny of the majority requires a judicial
response, disagreeing only on which minorities deserve protection.
This disagreement in turn derives from assumptions about whose interests
are stronger. For conservatives, property owners have strong and legitimate
interests in the enjoyment of their property, which is constantly being threatened
by governments controlled by lower-income people who seek redistribution. For
liberals, various minority groups and women have strong and legitimate interests
in not being discriminated against by governments frequently beholden to
majorities of white men.
Courts are in a difficult position. It is plausible that all these people care
deeply about their interests, but the real question is how, in the context of specific
controversies, to value interests that litigants allege are strong and are badly
harmed by laws and policies. The actual extent to which people care about their
property rights, or rights not to be discriminated against (for example, through
excessive stopping-and-frisking) is simply unknown. That information cannot be
elicited in a reliable way, and so judges must fall back on their intuitions, or social
science evidence that is almost always weak and contestable. 67
Judicial review also depends on judges being motivated to protect
minorities that actually lack political power and not the majority or minorities that
systematically prevail in the political process because they are well-organized and
influential. 68 But there is no guarantee that judges will act in this way. Judges are
appointed by the government, and in practice tend to advance the interests of
whatever government that appoints them. They end up protecting minorities
mainly because judges remain in power long after the coalition that supported the
government that appoints them has collapsed.
Seen in this way, judicial review is just another form of supermajority
rule—one where the supermajority threshold is effectively a function of political
configurations from a generation earlier. 69 Minorities associated with Party X will
66

D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (holding a ban on handgun possession in the home a
violation of the Second Amendment).
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Cf. Levinson, supra note.

22

have greater supermajoritarian protection if Party X was in power in the recent
past; otherwise, they will not. The connection between judicial review and
supermajoritarianism is clearer in other countries than in the United States. In
most countries, legislatures can overturn high court constitutional interpretations
by passing laws or engaging in other procedures that require a supermajority or
compliance with rules that protect minority interests. 70 And in the United States
as well as other countries, a supermajority can usually reverse constitutional
holdings through the amendment process. 71 But, as we have seen, supermajority
rule is a crude and unsatisfactory way of protecting minority interests.
In the United States, judicial review owes its prestige among liberals
because from the 1950s to the 1970s the Supreme Court protected minorities that
liberals care about and who (not coincidentally) played important political roles in
the coalition that supported the Democratic Party—above all, AfricanAmericans. 72 At that time, conservatives argued that the Supreme Court should
not protect minorities but should defer to the political process. 73 Today, the
prestige of the Supreme Court has risen among conservatives because it
increasingly protects minorities that conservatives care about—property owners,
businesses, and gun owners, among others. 74 These groups have played important
roles in the Republican coalition. Meanwhile, liberals increasingly argue that the
Supreme Court should be more deferential to the political process. 75 Like a pure
supermajority rule, judicial review as practiced in the United States provides
minorities with an instrument for protecting their interests; but unlike a pure
supermajority rule, there is a temporal component to judicial review because of
the lag between the appointment of judges and most of their rulings. 76
70
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A final point is that it should be easy to see how judicial review, if it can
be properly practiced, reconciles democratic commitments and protection of
minorities. The problem with democracy is not so much that majorities win. It is
that majorities win when their interests are weaker than the interests of
minorities. 77 If judges can value the interests of minorities and protect them only
when they are stronger than the majority’s interests, then striking down legislation
may be inconsistent with majority rule, but it is not inconsistent with welfaremaximization or a more robust conception of democracy that is oriented toward
welfare-maximization rather than the victory of the majority over a temporary or
entrenched minority. To the extent that the public recognizes this, it will rationally
lend its support in the long term to a court that strikes down legislation.
3. Executive Discretion and Technocracy
We should also mention a final common method for aggregating
preferences in a way that takes account of those who have intense preferences. In
the United States and many other countries, policies are frequently made by
bureaucracies or government agencies rather than by the legislature. These
agencies have considerable discretion to choose policies that advance the public
good as a whole rather than specific interests, and thus to give greater weight to
intense preferences, even if held by only a minority, than to weak preferences
held by the majority. If they are controlled by the chief executive, and if the chief
executive has strong electoral incentives to advance the public good, the agencies
may be motivated to choose regulations on the basis of aggregate preferences. 78
The problem is knowing what those preferences are. Since the 1980s, U.S.
regulatory agencies have increasingly relied on cost-benefit analysis. 79 Using
cost-benefit analysis, an agency evaluates a proposed regulation or project—like a
pollution control regulation—by determining whether the public benefits exceed
Comparative Politics and Comparative Constitutional Law: Constitutional Design for Divided
Societies, in Constitutional Design for Divided Societies (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2008).
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the (usually) private costs. Costs can be easily determined: they are simply the
financial cost of installing a scrubber or supplying workers with protective masks,
plus costs attributable to lost sales if the price increases. Determining benefits is
trickier. If the regulation improves the quality of air, the agency might determine
benefits by calculating avoided medical costs or property damage. But often the
benefits include general amenities (such as a clear rather than smoggy sky) or
avoided mortality, which are intrinsically hard to value. Agencies have developed
controversial methods for valuing these goods, such as contingent valuation,
where they simply ask people how much they would be willing to pay for a public
good.
Cost-benefit analysis addresses the problem of intense preferences by
measuring them in terms of willingness-to-pay. Suppose the question is whether
to impose a strict or weak pollution regulation. Asthmatics and others sensitive to
pollution are willing to pay a great deal for a low level of pollution, while other
people may not. The regulator aggregates the amounts that everyone is willing to
pay in order to determine the correct level of strictness. Thus, even if asthmatics
form a small minority, their preferences will influence the outcome by causing the
regulator to choose a higher level of pollution control than it would if it chose the
optimum for the majority. In this way, cost-benefit analysis improves on majority
voting, which in this context would result in no (rather than moderate) pollution
control.
But cost-benefit analysis suffers from numerous problems. As noted,
while regulators can sometimes derive valuations from market behavior, they
often cannot—precisely because government projects are used to generate public
goods where markets fail. Even when market valuations can be used, they reflect
the preferences of marginal, rather than average, consumers and are thus
extremely sensitive to spurious factors such as the state of technology.
Given these problems, agencies often run so-called “Contingent
Valuation” (CV) surveys that ask individuals to report their personal valuations
for (usually public) goods. 80 Contingent valuation surveys cannot guarantee that
people answer questions honestly or after thinking carefully about how public
resources should be used. In fact, participants in such surveys never have an
incentive to tell the truth unless they expect the survey to have no impact on
public policy; but if this is true, why run the survey in the first place? 81 Empirical
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evidence indicates that in practice these surveys deliver information of little
value. 82
In addition, wealth disparities can distort the valuations elicited by costbenefit analysis—the rich are willing to pay more for goods than the poor are,
even when those goods do not make the rich better off than the poor. 83 And,
finally, the executive branch of the government is not necessarily well-motivated
to use cost-benefit analysis honestly. When President Reagan ordered regulators
to use cost-benefit analysis in 1981, critics argued that he was trying to create
bureaucratic hurdles to regulation. 84 And then when President Clinton renewed
the order in the 1990s, critics argued that he did so for public relations reasons
only, and that his agencies manipulated cost-benefit analysis to rationalize
decisions made on political grounds. 85 The underlying problem is that cost-benefit
analysis requires a certain amount of discretion and judgment. If elected officials
seek to advance the interest of the majority rather than the general public, and can
control the bureaucracy, then giving it discretion does not solve the problem of
tyranny of the majority.
4. Summary
Concerns about majority exploitation of the minority are really concerns
that people with weak preferences about an issue determine policy that harms
people with strong preferences about that issue. Under majority rule with oneperson-one-vote, people with strong preferences will prevail if they happen to
form a majority, but if not, the policy outcome will reduce social welfare rather
than increase it. If those people with strong interests systematically lose whenever
a vote is held, outcomes will be deeply unfair and inequitable as well as
inefficient. But even if they sometimes win and sometimes lose, social welfare
will decline rather than increase over time.
As we have seen, institutional designers have developed numerous ways
of solving this problem, including the use of supermajority rules, weighted voting,
judicial enforcement of rights, and cost-benefit analysis. And, as we have seen, all
of these approaches are deeply flawed. We now turn to a possible solution.
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II. Quadratic Voting
A. The Problem
Suppose that the legitimate purpose of government is to advance the
public interest, and that advancing the public interest involves the welfarist goal
of generating gains for individuals. Suppose further that a public project can be
legitimate even though it produces losers as well as winners (as it inevitably will)
as long as the winners in aggregate gain a great deal and the losers in aggregate do
not lose too much—or as long as gains and losses are fairly distributed so that
over the long term everyone or nearly everyone gains on net. We don’t need to be
specific about how gains and losses are aggregated, and can acknowledge that
large gains to the very rich may not justify small losses to the very poor.
If the key difficulty with traditional voting rules is that they do not give
influence to people in proportion to the intensity of their preferences, then the
solution must address this problem in particular. Political scientists and
economists have proposed an enormous variety of voting systems to do just that.
The basic approach of these voting systems is to allow people to cast more votes
when their preferences are intense. Few of these systems have been implemented.
The problem is that they are too complex for people to understand, or too
vulnerable to manipulation. 86
It is useful to begin against the backdrop of the one institution that awards
goods according to the intensity of preference: the market. In the market, people
have different valuations for different goods; the market, when it works well,
channels goods to those who value them the most. In effect, the people who care
more about certain goods can express their interests in them to a greater extent
than others, and thus exert a greater influence on the ultimate allocation of goods.
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They do so, of course, by paying more money for those goods than other people
do. The price system forces people to make tradeoffs—to sacrifice the power to
make purchases in the future in return for the power to make purchases today—
and in this way enables people to sincerely reveal the strength of their preferences
in ownership of various goods, and obtain those goods that they value the most.
This is the famous logic of the “invisible hand” that ensures markets provide
efficient allocations, often called the Fundamental Theorems of Welfare
Economics.
The market fails to provide public goods for familiar reasons—those who
pay for goods cannot prevent others from free riding. 87 That is why a political
system with voting rules is necessary. But the analogy from the market suggests
that we could protect the interests of the minority by allowing people to buy
votes, or otherwise pay money to influence the allocation of public goods.
Suppose, for example, that the government implements a vote-buying
system where people pay $1 to the government for one vote on a project like the
construction of a park, and people can buy and cast as many votes as they want.
The government builds the park if people buy more votes for the park than against
it. And if vote-buying seems improper, consider that it already takes place in
corporations, where investors can increase their influence over corporations by
buying shares and the votes that come with them (and even votes without shares,
subject to some minimal corporate-law constraints). 88 It might seem that one can
generalize: if some people pay money to the government in return for greater
influence on political outcomes, and money helps fund those outcomes for the
benefit of others, then the people who pay the most should have the greatest
influence on outcomes.
There are two problems with this scheme. The first is that it gives the
wealthy excessive influence over political outcomes. The rich can buy more votes
than the poor, and even if they end up paying more for public projects, there is no
guarantee that those projects will advance the public good. The second problem—
and our focus—is that the proposal does not in fact give voters or vote-buyers the
right incentives to cast their votes for projects that advance the public good.
To see why, consider a simple setup where the goal of the government is
to maximize the well-being of the public, as measured by people’s willingness to
pay for public projects. A project should be approved, for example, if its backers
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would be willing to pay in aggregate $100 for its implementation while its
opponents would be willing to pay only $90 to block it. To evaluate projects, the
government must elicit people’s willingness-to-pay, which is generally private
information. (It is not always entirely private information; when governments
perform cost-benefit analysis, they estimate willingness-to-pay based on observed
market behavior. But cost-benefit analysis has well-known limitations and there is
almost always some component of private information. 89) People have strong
incentives to exaggerate their willingness-to-pay. A person willing to pay $10 for
a project might as well say that she would be willing to pay $20 or $100. Thus,
the government cannot elicit preferences simply by asking people what they are.
What about the vote-buying scheme? Now people must pay money, and
the requirement that they pay might put limits on their ability to exercise
influence over outcomes that is disproportionate to their interest in those
outcomes. One might think that a person who values a project like a park at $10
would offer $10 to the government in return for 10 one-dollar votes, and a person
who opposes the park might pay, say, $9 to block it. The government could
aggregate the payments (which could be put into its budget) and approve the
project if people buy more votes in favor of it than against it.
But people would not act this way. Most people would probably pay
nothing for (or against) the park and instead free ride. A person would reason that
if she buys some votes, they will not affect the outcome, especially if there are
thousands of voters, while the votes cost her something. And if she reasons farther
along the chain of outcomes, she might realize that others will think like her, in
which case maybe no one on her side will vote, in which case she would waste
money by voting. To be sure, she might realize that, based on this reasoning, no
one on the other side will vote either, in which case her votes might make a
difference. But it is quite unlikely that the small probability of affecting outcomes,
even given the behavior of others, will give her the right incentives to buy votes.
An example will illustrate the argument. Consider two members of a large
population, Pro and Con. Pro expects to gain $1000 if the government implements
a project, while Con expects to lose $50 from the project. Each person can buy
votes at $1 each. To determine how many votes to buy, Pro must first estimate the
probability that she will be the pivotal voter, and thus will affect the outcome. She
should not spend money on votes unless she can affect the outcome; otherwise,
she loses without gaining anything in return. Suppose Pro estimates that for every
vote she buys, she can increase the likelihood of approval of the project by one
89

See supra.

29

percent—at least, for a range of votes. Thus, each vote has an expected benefit of
$10. Pro will buy a lot of votes—stopping only when an additional vote increases
the probability of winning by less than one percent, which would happen if and
when Pro owns a large enough fraction of votes than the additional expected
impact of another vote declines to a low level.
Con, by contrast, will likely buy no votes. If he, like Pro, expects that each
additional vote will have a one percent impact, then the expected gain from a vote
is 50 cents, while the cost is $1. Yet the government wants to know Con’s
preference. If there is only one Pro, but more than 20 Cons, the Cons in aggregate
would be willing to pay more than Pro does. But because the Cons pay nothing,
the government approves a project that reduces group welfare. In fact, game
theoretical analysis under a variety of assumptions has shown that this simple
voting scheme leads to the dictatorship of the single individual with the most
intense preference, as illustrated in this example. 90
Thus the vote-buying scheme we have described will not work. It does not
force people to sincerely reveal their preferences, and so it will produce outcomes
that do not advance social welfare. It addresses and overcomes the major problem
of majority rule—that it does not enable people to exert influence in proportion to
the intensity of their preferences—but only at the cost of replacing it with an even
worse system, dictatorship: while it allows Pro, in a minority of one, to prevail
over the many Cons when Pro’s preferences are sufficiently intense, it does so
even when the Cons should prevail because of their large numbers, and in other
examples it would not help the minority at all. Yet the hypothetical vote-buying
scheme also makes clear why conventional voting is problematic as well.
Conventional voting provides no method for people to reveal the strength of their
interests. One casts a single vote and can do no more.
B. Quadratic Voting
Recently, one of us proposed a variant of vote-buying that solves the
problems we have been discussing. 91 Under Quadratic Voting (QV), everyone
may buy as many votes as she wants, and pays for each vote, but the price she
pays is the square of the number of votes that she casts. One vote costs $1, 2 votes
cost $4, and so on. A project is approved if the votes in favor exceed the votes
against. The money that is collected is returned to all voters on a pro rata basis.
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Suppose, for example, that the government announces a proposal to build
a park in the center of town. Every member of the town is given the right to vote
for or against the proposal. People who live in the center of town strongly favor
the park. Some of them spend $100 for 10 votes; others $81 for 9 votes or $121
for 11 votes, or even more. People who live farther from the center are less
enthusiastic about the use of tax dollars for a park that they will rarely be able to
visit. Some of them favor the park but only slightly; they buy 1 vote for $1 or 2
votes for $4. Others do not buy any votes at all, or spend a few dollars to oppose
the park. And then there are some people who strongly object to this use of
taxpayer dollars. They spend $100 for 10 votes against the park, or $144 for 12
votes, and so on. The government counts up the votes: if the proposal receives a
majority of votes, it is approved. The money that is collected is then distributed
back to people pro rata. For example, if 1000 people live in town, and $10,000 is
collected, then everyone receives $10 back. This means that people who spend
(say) $9 for 3 votes (for or against) will end up netting $1. Thus, people who
oppose or support the park only slightly are fully compensated even if they lose.
People who spend more money are partially compensated.
To understand why the voter should pay the square of the number of votes
she paid rather than some other amount (such as the cube or some other power),
consider Table 1, below, which shows the cost of voting under QV, and includes
the marginal cost—the additional amount that a voter must pay to cast an
additional vote. 92
Table 1: Total and Marginal Cost of Voting Under QV
Votes
Total Cost
Marginal Cost
1
1
1
2
4
3
3
9
5
4
16
7
5
25
9
6
36
11
7
49
13
8
64
15
16
256
31
32
1024
63
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As can be easily seen, the marginal cost of casting a vote is always (within $1)93
proportionate to the number of votes cast. It costs twice as much at the margin to
cast 4 votes than to cast 2 votes ($7 rather than $3); twice as much to cast 8 votes
than to cast 4 votes ($15 rather than $7); twice as much to cast 16 votes than to
cast 8 votes ($31 rather than $15); and so on.
Rational agents maximize their utility by setting marginal cost equal to
marginal benefit. This means that if John values being able to incrementally move
the outcome in his favor twice as much as Sue values being able to incrementally
move the outcome in her favor, John will pay twice as much at the margin as Sue
does. For example, John buys 16 votes while Sue buys 8 votes. The exact number
of votes that John and Sue buy depends on their estimates of how likely they will
be pivotal voters, as explained below, so if John buys 16 votes for $256 (162), this
does not mean that he values the project at $256. But it does mean that he values
the project twice as much as Sue, who buys 8 votes. The government can thus
determine which group of people—supporters or opponents—is willing to pay
more in aggregate for the project even though it does not know how much any
individual (or the group) values the project. Crucially, QV gives weigh both to
numerosity and the intensity of interests. A large group of people with weak
preferences might outvote a very small group of people with intense preferences,
but not a somewhat larger group of people with intense preferences.
QV works best with a large number of voters: the more voters there are,
the more accurately the system works. QV’s efficiency relies on all voters
perceiving the chance of their changing the outcome with an additional vote as the
same. When the number of voters is large, such a perception is (approximately)
accurate. If it is small, it is less so. With a small population, it becomes possible
for people to have different perceptions about the likelihood that an additional
vote will change the outcome (that is, the likelihood that there would otherwise be
a tie, in which case an additional vote is pivotal). For example, in a small group
that consists of a number of moderate voters on one side of an issue, and an
extreme voter on the other side, the extreme voter will believe that a tie is less
likely than the moderate voters will believe. The moderate voters assume that all
voters are (on average) moderate and so discount the possibility that anyone is
extreme, while the extreme voter knows that this is not the case because she
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knows that she is an outlier. If the extreme voter cares more about the issue than
the moderate voters in aggregate, she will buy fewer votes relative to her utility
than is socially desirable and QV will suffer the same bias towards the majority
that other democratic procedures entail, though in a less severe form. If the
situation were reversed and the extreme voter cared less than the three others in
total, a reversed failure could occur. The three voters are overconfident and expect
to win easily, but the extremist knows that, because of her strong preferences and
thus her willingness to buy many votes, a tie is more likely than it appears. In this
case, QV could lead to dictatorship in the same manner as standard vote buying.
Despite this, simulation evidence indicates that QV almost always outperforms
majority rule. 94
However, as the size of the group increases, the probability of either of
these problems arising becomes small because no individual is capable of having
much influence on the chance of a tie. In a large enough group, everyone has the
proper incentive to buy votes in a way that reflects her honest appraisal of her
likelihood of being pivotal. QV is not perfectly efficient, only approximately so,
with the approximation growing more precise as the population grows larger, 95
and as the variance of the preferences of the members of the population declines.
Both of these properties closely resemble those of a well-functioning market in a
market economy: If markets are not thick enough, then large sellers or buyers may
have market power that prevents perfect competition. Simulations indicate that
groups of a few dozen will almost always produce efficient results. 96
QV addresses the problem of varying intensities of preferences by giving
those with stronger preferences a means of influencing the outcome in proportion
to the strength of their preferences. They may still lose to the majority, but they
will not lose to a majority with weak preferences (unless the majority is extremely
large). Majorities will prevail over minorities—as they should—when the
intensities of everyone’s preferences are similar. But when minorities are
sufficiently intense, or relatively large and intense, they can protect their interests
from majority domination. Indeed, QV ensures optimal outcomes (with high
probability if there are many voters) if the goal is to maximize the well-being of
the group. Thus, it is superior to majority and supermajority rule or any other
voting rule, which cannot, except extremely crudely, protect people with strong
preferences. QV is also superior to cost-benefit analysis because cost-benefit
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analysis cannot incorporate private information about the intensity of non-market
preferences.
Figure 1 illustrates how QV works. The three straight lines illustrate the
expected benefits that three different people obtain from a project. The lines slope
upwards because the probability of prevailing increases with the number of votes
one casts. In the example, person 1 obtains a marginal benefit of 1/2 from
prevailing; person 2 obtains a marginal benefit of 1; and person 3 obtains a
marginal benefit of 6/5. The curved line shows the quadratic cost of voting—the
square of the number of votes cast. Inspection shows that each person buys a
number of votes in proportion to the expected marginal benefit—person 2 buys
twice as many votes as person 1, and person 3 buys 6/5 as many votes as person
2. Indeed, as noted before, they buy a number of votes equal to half of their
marginal benefit. Thus, the government can, by totaling up the votes and
awarding the decision to the majority, perfectly reflect the aggregation of their
preferences.
Figure 1: Relative Voting Power Under QV
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A further point is that because of the redistribution, the voters who lose
will be at least partly compensated. Recall that under QV, the money that is paid
in is returned to members of the group on a pro rata basis. This means that
members of an outvoted minority will receive some money back. Those with
relatively weak preferences—who therefore did not buy many votes—are likely to
be fully compensated, while those with stronger preferences will be only partly
compensated. While it might be better if they were fully compensated, full
compensation (which would guarantee Pareto outcomes) is not practical.
Moreover, partial compensation is superior to no compensation, which is the
outcome under majority rule, and to excessive compensation, which is the
outcome when a large minority can block desirable projects under supermajority
rule, and so can demand a large transfer in return for its consent.
We can illustrate with an example. Imagine a group of 30 people, divided
into three groups of ten people with identical preferences. 97 Anne (whose
preferences are identical to those of everyone in the first group) obtains 1600
from a project; Bruce loses 800; and Carla loses 400. Under majority rule, Bruce
and Carla would outvote Anne even though Anne’s gain is greater than their
combined losses. Under QV, Anne buys 8 votes in favor while Bruce buys 4 votes
against and Carla buys 2 votes against—in all cases, because under QV a voter
buys a number of votes equal to half her expected marginal benefit, which in this
example is assumed to reflect everyone’s estimate that there is a 1/100 chance of
being the pivotal voter. Table 2 shows that under QV Anne would pay enough to
outvote Bruce and Carla 8 to 6. The penultimate column shows how the
redistribution works, and the last column shows each person’s net payoff.
Table 2: An Example
Voter
Anne (10)
Bruce (10)
Carla (10)
QV
Majority Rule

Benefit
1600
-800
-400

Marginal Benefit
16
-8
-4

Votes
8 Pro
4 Con
2 Con
8 – 6: Pro
2 – 1: Con

Cost
$64
$16
$4

Share
$28
$28
$28

Net
$1600-64+28=$1564
-$800-16+28= -$788
-$400-4+28= -$376
$400
-$400

Observe that QV produces the optimal outcome because Anne (and her 9
doppelgangers) values the project more than Bruce and Carla (and their
doppelgangers) disvalue it. Under majority rule, by contrast, the project is
defeated. QV generates a surplus of $400 over majority rule. The sharing rule
97

We assume 10 of each time because, as noted supra, QV works better with a large number of
people than with a few. But in our discussion of the example, we focus on the three different
representative agents.

35

reduces the variance of the outcome, though not by very much in this particular
example.
C. A Real-World Example: Proposition 8
Let’s now consider a real example. Proposition 8 was the California ballot
initiative that banned gay marriage in 2008. Proposition 8 became law because it
received majority approval, 52 percent to 48 percent of those voting. 98
Proposition 8 almost surely burdened a minority—specifically, gays and lesbians
who might want to marry—more than it benefited the majority, who may have
seen moral or religious positions vindicated but were not otherwise directly
affected by whether same-sex marriages existed or not.
We can illustrate the argument with some back-of-the-envelope
calculations. 99 Gay, lesbian, and transgender (LGBT) voters constituted about
four percent of California’s population in 2010, while same-sex couples
constituted about 0.7 percent of households. We assume that the average samesex couple would pay $100,000 for the right to marry, based on the fact that the
average marriage ceremony costs $25,000 and LGBT couples are on average
wealthier than heterosexual couples; and that single LGBT voters would pay
$20,000 for the option to marry a same-sex person. This implies aggregate
willingness to pay by LGBT voters to defeat Proposition 8 was $57 billion. 100 If
all LGBT voters voted against Proposition 8, then among heterosexuals, the vote
was 52 percent to 44 percent, implying a margin of 3,040,000 heterosexual
supporters of Proposition 8. Assuming supporters and opponents have similar
preference intensities, the residual supporters would have to have been willing to
pay $18,750 each, assuming non-LGBT opponents were willing to pay the same
amount, in order for Proposition 8 to have been welfare-maximizing. This seems
most unlikely. In California, the median household income was $61,021 in
2008. 101 It is hard to believe that people who are deeply opposed to same-sex
marriage would pay almost a third of their income to block it. Thus, Proposition 8
seems like a clear example of tyranny of the majority—where a majority with
weak preferences prevails over a minority with strong preferences.
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If we assume more realistically that the marginal 8 percent of supporters
would have been willing to pay on average $400 to ban same-sex marriage, while
the (approximately) 4 percent of opponents would have been willing to pay on
average $20,000, then the opponents would outvote the supporters under QV.
Suppose, for example, that everyone thought the probability of affecting the
outcome by buying a vote is one tenth of one percent. Then the supporters would
buy 0.2 votes for 40 cents and the opponents would buy 10 votes for $100. The
opponents would outvote the supporters even though there were only half as many
opponents.
One might object that people’s willingness to pay is beside the point;
either there is a right to same-sex marriage or there isn’t. Moreover, QV would
not have blocked Proposition 8 if the gay and lesbian population were sufficiently
small or supporters’ preferences were sufficiently strong. This might seem unjust
and wrong.
But this objection puts the cart before the horse. Rights will be recognized
only if there is sufficient political or institutional support for them. Gays and
lesbians do better in a QV system than in a majority or supermajority rule system
because the intensity of their preferences regarding matters close to their everyday
lives will exceed the intensity of the moral or ideological preferences of the
average voter, and QV, unlike the other systems, allows preference intensity to
affect political outcomes. Judicial enforcement of rights will protect gays and
lesbians only if judges are persuaded to do so—and that will happen only if
judges with the right ideological preferences are in office. In practice, judges do
not protect all minorities (there is no way to do that) or even the minorities who
most need protecting. They protect minorities who participated in the majority
coalition that appointed the judges a generation or so earlier. So in some eras,
judges appointed by Democratic presidents protect African-Americans, poor
people, and other constituents of the Democratic Party—while in other eras,
judges appointed by Republican presidents protect creditors, property-owners,
gun owners, and other constituents of the Republican Party. If QV had been in
place in 2008, Proposition 8 likely would never have passed, and so supporters of
same-sex marriage would not have had to wait until 2013 for the courts to rule it
unconstitutional. 102 Indeed, if QV had been in place earlier, then a ballot
proposition legalizing same-sex marriage probably would have been passed
before 2008.
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QV protects minorities by giving people with intense interests that are
disregarded by the majority a chance to affect political outcomes, but it does not
fully displace judicial review. Someone must enforce the rules of the game, and
courts play that function in our society. QV would have been useless against Jim
Crow because blacks in the south were disenfranchised: being disenfranchised
under QV is no better than being disenfranchised under a traditional voting
system, though as we discuss below QV does dramatically reduce or eliminate the
incentive for such disenfranchisement. Moreover, various theories of judicial
review—for example, that it is necessary to protect fundamental values—may be
unaffected by our argument. But judicial review would become significantly less
important if a system of QV is in place.
D. Would the Rich Exert Too Much Influence under QV?
QV offers more influence to those with greater financial resources than
they could obtain under simply majority rule. The rich are willing to pay more for
any given non-financial good than are the poor because money is worth less to
them. One might thus worry that a society governed by QV would be inequitable.
In this section, we show that from the standpoint of equity, QV is likely to be
superior to one-person-one-vote majority rule.
1. Pure Transfers
One possible concern is that rich people will buy votes to support
monetary transfers from poor to rich. This will not happen, however. While the
rich are willing to pay more to obtain non-financial goods than are the poor, they
are not willing to pay more to obtain money. Consider a scheme that took a dollar
from every individual in the bottom 50% of the income distribution and gave $50
to every individual in the top 1%. A member of the top 1% would not pay more
than $49 to enact such a proposal, which would give them 7 votes each. Such a
proposal could be defeated by the bottom 50%, each buying 0.5 of a vote, which
would only cost him or her a quarter each. Robbing the poor to pay the rich never
prevails under QV.
QV blocks purely redistributive projects because it permits only efficient
projects and redistributive projects are not efficient because they do not generate
wealth. Indeed, as we will see, QV permits redistributive projects only to the
extent that people care about distribution. Because wealthier people do care about
the poor 103 (although maybe not enough), under QV they will support some
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redistribution to the poor, just as they do under majority rule. By contrast, because
the poor do not—in their own minds or anyone else’s—benefit by giving their
money to the rich, QV would not result in redistribution to the rich.
2. Redistribution as Social Insurance
We can make this argument more rigorous by considering some theories
about why redistribution exists in the first place. One influential economic view
of the purpose of redistribution (or progressive taxation), first put forward by
Vickrey, 104 is that taxation is a form of social insurance. Taxes and transfers blunt
risks that are outside of any individual’s control, thus providing her with valued
insurance against bad events like sickness and job loss. The problem, however, is
that taxes and transfers also blunt incentives to work and improve oneself. Thus,
the optimal tax-and-transfer system balances these two factors—redistributing
enough to protect people from the risk of income loss while not so much as to
excessively blunt incentives to be productive.
One complication is that when people vote for tax-and-transfer schemes,
they already know something about themselves—including, at least roughly, the
risk that they may lose their jobs and benefit from social insurance. To understand
this problem, we can consider three extreme cases. In the first, suppose people
know nothing about themselves: they choose whether to support a social
insurance scheme behind the veil of ignorance, before anyone makes any
investments to improve their human capital or knows whether they will be lucky
or unlucky in the lottery of life. In such a case, everyone would support the
optimal, behind-the-veil-of-ignorance tax policy that maximizes utilitarian
welfare. The reason is that a social insurance scheme is a public good—one that
in this context gives everyone an insurance policy for which she would be willing
to pay. This problem was studied by Mirrlees 105 and while debate rages about
parameters that determine the optimal tax policy, most economists believe it
involves high and progressive taxes. 106 QV would produce this outcome simply
because it always chooses the welfare-maximizing result.
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In a second case, suppose that individuals are highly uncertain about their
earnings but all investments that determine these earnings have already been
made. In this case, there would be an extremely strong temptation to impose
100% taxation, even though, having known this beforehand, no one would have
made any investment. This is a well-known time-consistency problem that can
easily lead to excessive taxation of accumulated capital and most countries avoid
the temptation for such taxes because they know that it will deter future
investment. Democracies develop institutions like courts to reduce the risk of
time-inconsistent policies; leaders also seem to understand that if they violate past
commitments, they will not be trusted in the future. Thus, countries usually pay
off sovereign debt so that they can borrow again. QV does not directly block
time-inconsistent policies, but neither does majority or supermajority rule. But
QV, unlike those other rules, does block time-inconsistent policies that are purely
redistributive to the majority (or supermajority).
In a third case, opposite to the second, one can imagine the case where no
investments have yet been made but everyone knows exactly the realization of the
factors outside of their control that determine their destiny. In this case, insurance
has no value to any individual and even though some individuals will favor higher
taxes for redistribution, such taxes have no efficiency benefits. In this case, QV
will favor eliminating redistributive taxation entirely.
However, this case is just as unrealistic as the second one. In reality, some
investments are sunk and some uncertainty realized, but likely about roughly
equal amounts of each, at least when averaged over the population. In this setting,
QV would produce the optimal social insurance plan covering the residual level of
uncertainty. Given the balance, it is likely the optimum would resemble that in the
first case, where agents choose the social insurance system behind the veil of
ignorance.
By contrast, equilibrium in such a model under one-person-one-vote
majority-rule voting is indeterminate, or at least no one has ever been able to
derive a determinate outcome. The problem is that any coalition of 51% of the
population has an incentive to choose policies that are highly disadvantageous to
the other 49% of the population. This coalition might be the bottom 51% of the
distribution in terms of their current luck-accumulation and income, in which case
democracy may be highly redistributive, expropriating the top 49% at the
revenue-maximizing rate. This rate will not be confiscatory because beyond a
point taxation is counterproductive because of reduced effort. But Saez shows that
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this revenue-maximizing rate is extremely high, upwards of 80%. 107 On the other
hand, if the coalition is the top 51% of the population, the incentive will be to
maximize the revenue extracted from the bottom 49% and redistribute to the top
51%. That is, the outcomes yielded by majority rule are hard to predict, as many
coalitions are possible. This fact is borne out by historical experience of coalitions
in democracies shifting from protecting the interests of elites to attempting to
redistribute from these elites.
One way to generate a more definite prediction is to restrict the policies
the government can implement. The most famous such analysis is due to Meltzer
and Richard. 108 They argue that a government choosing a proportional tax rate
and rebating the proceeds evenly across the population will choose the tax to
maximize the preferences of the individual with median income. This outcome
may be more or less redistributive than the optimum that QV will implement. If
the median income is quite high relative to the mean (if there is little inequality at
the top end of the income distribution) but many individuals are in dire poverty,
Meltzer and Richard predict that majority rule will lead to very little
redistribution. However, QV would lead to strong redistribution because the risk
of falling into extreme poverty would loom large enough in each individual’s
utility calculus to blunt the opposition of the middle class to redistribution to the
poor.. If there is little poverty but significant income inequality towards the top of
the distribution, then Meltzer and Richard would predict more redistribution than
QV.
But such a linear tax and transfer system is only one way to implement
redistribution and many, if not most, democracies do not operate that way. For
example, Holland argues that in most developing countries formal state transfers
do not reach the poor and instead are targeted at the middle class that works in the
formal sector. 109 In such settings, democracy will experience swings (based on
whether at a given time a majority is or is not covered by the formal system)
between “cozy” middle class regimes that harm the poor and rich equally with
high tax rates that sponsor generous pensions for the middle class, and “populist”
governments that gut the state and are supported by the wealthy and the poor
while being opposed by the middle class. This pattern fits the politics of many
Latin American countries. QV, by contrast, will consistently yield a moderate
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level of formal benefits that trades off providing insurance to the middle classes
against the costs of inefficiency and undue burdens on the poor.
Thus, majority rule is not the ally of sensible, balanced, egalitarian
policies it is often made out to be. Exactly what outcomes majority rule favors is
extremely sensitive to the particular coalitions that are cobbled together to form a
majority. Some of these coalitions will produce outcomes that are more
redistributive than is optimal, others less. Nearly all political outcomes will be
unfair and inefficient. This may explain why there is huge variation across
democracies in the distribution of wealth. It is simply a mistake to assume that
majority with one-person-one-vote must lead to an equitable distribution. QV, by
contrast, consistently favors the optimum that balances the benefits of social
insurance against the deadweight loss created by excessive taxation. 110
3. Altruism of the Rich
Redistribution of wealth may also be motivated by altruism by the wealthy
or middle class, or by related concerns, for example, that inequality is a source of
social instability. Under this assumption, a transfer of wealth is just a public
good. 111 Because QV generates efficient outcomes, it will produce such a public
good, leading to some degree of redistribution to the poor. By contrast, oneperson-one-vote majority rule does not lead to efficient outcomes, as we have
explained. A large minority that passionately seeks to use tax receipts to fund
poor relief can easily be outvoted by a small majority that does not care about the
poor or cares very little. Accordingly, along this dimension (and putting aside
reasons why majority rule could lead to excessive redistribution discussed in the
prior section), QV should lead to the more equitable outcome.
4. Biased Projects and Laws
One might also worry that even if QV does not produce monetary transfers
from poor to rich, it will generate projects that the rich favor and the poor
disfavor. For example, one might imagine that a city that uses QV would fund
yachting marinas and public art rather than parks, or pot hole repair on streets in
rich neighborhoods and not streets in poor neighborhoods. The rich would pay
110
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more for votes than the poor, and this would cause a bias in favor of public
projects that the rich prefer.
However, there are several reasons for doubting that the rich would have
excessive power under QV. First, the rich as a group do not have influence if they
are on both sides of an issue, as they often are. And quadratic pricing minimizes
the impact of large wealth disparities because the cost of buying votes increases
exponentially. A rich person who sought to outvote one thousand poor people
would need to spend $1 million for 1000 votes if each poor person spent $1 for
one vote.
Second, while the rich exercise greater influence, they must pay for it—
just as they do in the private market—and the money will end up in the pockets of
the non-rich. Indeed, the very poor, who are indifferent to many public projects
and therefore often do not vote, will likely do better under QV than under the
current system, because the rich and middle class must, in effect, pay the poor
whenever they vote. Under the current system, a poor person can exercise
theoretical influence over same-sex marriage by exercising the vote but is not
likely to do so; under QV that person at least receives money in return for
yielding influence to others, and she can use this money to buy food and clothes.
By allowing the wealthy to obtain greater influence over public goods, about
which they care more, by transferring to the poor greater influence over private
goods (in the sense of giving them money through the QV process which they can
use to buy goods and services they need), QV would likely improve distributive
justice rather than reduce it. In effect, QV gives the poor a new asset (the power to
influence the allocation of public goods) that they can sell to the rich in return for
money that they need more than the influence.
Many public projects—New York’s Central Park, Chicago’s Millennium
Park—reflect the preferences of the wealthy who partly finance the projects in
return for influence over them. Thus, Millennium Park contains sophisticated
artwork to a far greater degree than an ordinary public park does. The poor benefit
both from the public good and the fact that they don’t need to pay for as much of
it out of their taxes. Thus, one must remember that even under the status quo, the
rich exert greater influence over public projects by financing a disproportionate
share of them—an arrangement that may not be optimal or ideal but seems to be
mutually beneficial. A system of QV would institutionalize this process and make
it more transparent and fair.
Indeed, it is far from obvious that QV would increase the influence of the
wealthy compared to the status quo, where the wealthy already have a variety of
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means to buy influence through lobbying, campaign spending, and similar
activities. 112 These pathways to influence would be greatly dampened by QV. The
reason is that under the current system, people who want to exert influence target
the swing voters—the people who don’t care and thus can be moved to change
their vote on the basis of relatively small expenditures on advertising. Under QV,
there is no reason to target the people in the middle because those people will not
buy very many votes even if they are shifted over at the margin. Influencers
would use their money to target more passionate people because those people
spend a lot of money on their marginal vote. Their financial interest thus may
make them more susceptible to reasoned argument.
Much of government policy already reflects the influence of wealth people
because of the nature of cost-benefit analysis, which is routinely used by agencies.
Cost-benefit analysis is based on the willingness-to-pay of affected people, which
in turn is based on their market behavior. Thus, if rich people care more about
clean air than poor people, and so are willing to pay more for it, then
environmental regulations will cut pollution in a way that reflects rich people’s
preferences more than poor people’s preferences. 113 While some people believe
that this is unfair, the general view is that preferences among rich and poor do not
in practice vary enough to make a difference in government policy choices. If this
is so, then quadratic voting would also not favor the rich over the poor.
Third, the social consequences of walling off the public sphere from
efficiency is often not to make the public sphere “fairer” but to shrink it. Cities
where the wealthy cannot express their willingness to pay to keep streets clean
and safe and to create public infrastructure because majority rule gives them no
means of doing so are plagued by what John Kenneth Galbraith in The Affluent
Society called “the social imbalance” where people emerge from Rolls Royces
112
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and Trump Towers to walk along potholed streets. 114 This social imbalance leads
the rich to retreat to the suburbs and to surround themselves with those similar to
themselves. The social imbalance similarly leads to inaction on the international
stage on global issues, like climate change and genocide. Those, often on the left,
who believe in an active public sphere should not seek to defend a false
egalitarianism that impoverishes the public sphere.
Finally, if one rejects all of these arguments, a version of QV can still
offer significant gains even without deviating at all from egalitarian norms in
elections. In a race with more than two candidates, or an election where more than
a single issue is decided, individuals could be allocated an artificial currency that
they could use to quadratically buy votes on individual issues. This would allow
individuals to trade less influence on issues they care less about for greater
influence on issues they care more about. By allowing people to express the
intensity of their preferences, the process would help address many of the
paradoxes and incoherencies of democracy that arise because standard voting
systems do not allow people to express the intensity of their preferences. 115 In
fact, greater efficiency gains could be achieved if individuals were allowed to
save these tokens across elections, devoting more to elections where they cared
more. Another possibility would be to reduce the influence of the wealthy by
making individuals pay a quadratic fraction of their gross adjusted federal income
rather than a quadratic number of dollars for influence. While both of these
systems would achieve smaller efficiency gains than would QV using money,
they could still greatly improve on simple majority rule.
It is important, as always, to compare QV with the existing political
system or realizable variations of it, not with an unattainable ideal. In existing
polities, the wealthier have more influence than the less wealthy because they can
make campaign donations, take advantage of contacts, and so on. Under QV, this
advantage would be both reduced and channeled more productively.
E. QV in Representative Democracy
The system of QV we have discussed so far resembles a referendum.
People vote directly for a proposal by buying votes using the quadratic price. But
114

John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society (1st ed. 1958).
See Nicolas de Condorcet Political Writings, (Steven Lukes & Nadia Urbinati eds., Cambridge
University Press 2012); Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (1951), Allan
Gibbard, Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result, 41 Econometrica 587 (1973); Mark
Allen Satterthwaite, Strategy-proofness and Arrow’s Conditions: Existence and Correspondence
Theorems for Voting Procedure and Social Welfare Functions, 10 J. Econ. Theory 187 (1975).
115

45

referenda are rare in large countries, which (if they are democratic) rely on
representative institutions. This raises the question how QVB would work in a
representative democracy.
Voting for representatives under a system of QV could take different
forms. In the interest of the space, we sketch out a possible approach but leave the
details for future research. Consider a system in which voters buy votes for
candidates for office by paying a quadratic price, with the money returned to
voters pro rata. The QV system would operate at the level of the office—at the
district level, for representatives; at the state level, for senators; and at the national
level, for the president. The theory behind QV applies to representatives in the
same way that it applies to projects. Under the QV system, the representative will
be chosen whose expected performance maximizes the aggregate well-being of
voters. Knowing this, candidates will select positions that maximize the welfare
of their constituents, just as they choose positions maximizing the preferences of
the median voter under majority rule. 116
Applying QV to voting in a representative body requires an additional
step. It would make little sense for legislators to put their own money at stake
when voting. Instead, legislators should commit their constituents’ money when
they vote on bills. Suppose, for example, that a set amount of money collected
through taxes is sent back to districts (and states) at the end of every year. The
amount of money legislators have committed through QV during that year is
subtracted from that payment. Legislators would reflect their constituents’
interests faithfully so that they are reelected; and the legislators’ own votes would
be aggregated efficiently.
Consider, for example, a vote on whether the U.S. government should go
to war with a foreign country. Legislators would vote by committing their
constituents’ money. If the legislators are faithful agents, passionate backers and
opponents of the war would end up paying more money than people who are
indifferent or close to indifferent. The redistribution of the money would blunt the
impact but there would still be monetary winners and losers. Anticipating these
costs and benefits, voters would elect and sanction their representatives using
money from their own pockets based on QV.
Representative institutions face the same problem of preference
aggregation that exists in the referendum-style votes that we discussed in the last
section. Each representative represents a different group of constituents who have
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different interests. A particular bill will affect those groups in different ways—
some greatly, others hardly at all. This means that representatives who seek
reelection will also vary in their interests in passage of the bill. A majority of
representatives who weakly oppose a bill may thus be able to outvote a minority
of representatives who strongly favor it—reflecting the distribution of interests in
the broader population. Thus, there is a constant danger that one-person-one-vote
majority rule in representative bodies will lead to socially bad outcomes.
Representatives avoid these outcomes by logrolling: legislators are given
pet projects in their districts in return for their support for national legislation.
While many observers criticize such practices as corrupt, 117 it is important to
remember that many landmark legislative achievements never could have been
accomplished without logrolling; the recent film Lincoln provides the particularly
poignant example of the Thirteenth Amendment, whose passage in Congress was
secured through various patronage payoffs to elected officials. 118 New Deal
legislation and civil rights laws would not have been passed but for logrolling. 119
The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, which was needed to
address the financial crisis, was initially blocked in the House, and was passed
only after leaders arranged for a range of payoffs, including a reduction in the
depreciation schedule for improvements to restaurant buildings, extension of tax
credits for solar energy installations, and tax exemptions or subsidies for film and
television producers, rum producers in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, racing
track facilities, manufacturers of wool products, and manufacturers of toy wooden
arrows. 120 Of course, logrolling is not always, or even usually efficient, and is
typically done, not through direct and therefore efficient exchanges of tax
payments across districts, but rather by wasteful pet projects. 121 QV would offer a
more rational, efficient and fair means of allowing the incentive to “bring home
the pork” to be weighed against national interests in an efficient manner. It would
thus channel existing corrupt or at least unseemly, but necessary, wheel-greasing
into socially efficient bargaining.
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What about the risk that wealthy people will buy their way into elected
office by purchasing votes for themselves? Just like today, rich people will have
an advantage under QV. But while rich people under the current system can
improve their electoral prospects by using personal funds to buy advertising, rich
people under QV would use their funds to buy votes, with the money being
redistributed to the non-rich, rather than being wasted on advertisements.
Moreover, because of the square function, QV would not give even very rich
people a serious advantage. An illustrative example is Silvio Berlusconi. Under
QV he could, with 2.5 billion euros (roughly half of his net worth), buy 50,000
votes in a single election. That would only constitute 0.2% of the vote in the last
Italian general election. On the other hand, at present Berlusconi has managed to
win half a dozen elections in Italy, overwhelmingly because of the influence of
his wealth. Thus, a very wealthy person, especially one very wealthy person able
to dominate the media, can have far more influence through advertising than he or
she could ever have through QV.
QV is a more natural fit for referenda than for representative institutions in
the sense that it would require fewer far-reaching changes to how political
institutions work. Thus, we make this proposal fully aware that it may seem too
radical ever to be put in place and many details clearly need to be worked out. At
the U.S. national level, it would require constitutional amendment; however, at
local levels, experimentation is possible. Moreover, there are numerous secondbest type issues that we have not addressed. The role of the presidential veto in
such a system is obscure; it is probably unnecessary. QV in representative
assemblies would probably make more sense in a parliamentary system than in a
presidential system.
F. QV, the Franchise and Constitutional Stability
One of the major advantages of QV is that it should lead to greater
constitutional stability than exists under one-person-one-vote majority rule. The
latter system is famously vulnerable to constitutional manipulation. Under a
majority-rule system, the majority can simply pass a law that disenfranchises the
minority. Whatever majority forms initially would be tempted to do this.
Democracies have developed numerous elaborate mechanisms to prevent
majorities from entrenching their power. For example, judges strike down laws
that disenfranchise minorities, and amendment of the Constitution typically
requires a supermajority. But if the Constitution is too hard to change, then large
groups of people may seek change through extra-constitutional means, and to
experiment with non-democratic forms of government like dictatorship.
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By contrast, under QV only laws that are efficiency-maximizing can pass.
This rules out any revision that replaces QV with a less efficient form of
governance. It would rule out, for example, returning from QV to majority rule, or
replacing QV with an oligarchy or dictatorship. While the majority or other group
might favor such a move, those opposed would oppose more strongly and those in
favor more weakly, precisely by the basic efficiency logic of QV. Additionally,
recall that QV is only approximately (with high probability) efficient and that the
approximation is more accurate the less that any individual with outlier
preferences opposes the efficient proposals brought forward relative to the status
quo. As a result, among all efficiency-enhancing measures, QV tends to favor
those that create the fewest and the least extreme losers relative to the status quo,
as the only thing that can defeat an efficient law under QV is the strong
opposition of an extreme opponent. Thus, QV will not replace itself with a less
efficient alternative and, if it replaces itself with a (as yet undiscovered) more
efficient alternative, will do so in the way that minimizes the redistribution across
individuals that occurs through the transition. Because no other practical and
efficient alternative to QV exists,122 it seems highly unlikely such an efficient
alternative would arise. QV is thus the maximally constitutionally stable form of
governance.
One form of constitutional change, for example, to which QV is resilient is
the disenfranchisement of some subset of citizens. Even more strongly, QV
actually favors the enfranchisement of individuals currently outside of the polity,
so long as revenues are not shared with them. The reason is that individuals
included in the system will exert influence on the decision only if they are willing
to make transfers to the rest of the polity that compensate the polity for the
externalities created by the newly-enfranchised individual. A good analogy is
again the market economy: every country benefits by opening to free trade
because of the possibilities it offers to benefit from the products of other
countries. Because QV, like free trade but unlike standard voting systems, is a
positive rather than zero sum game, QV will encourage broadening the sphere of
political inclusion rather than shrinking it.
QV is also likely to be much more resilient to extra-system revolutionary
upheavals than majority rule is. Such upheavals are highly inefficient and thus
any system that maximizes aggregate utility is likely to go to large lengths to
avoid them. Democracies, also, go to lengths to avoid them. However, it can
easily be in the interest of a narrow majority to risk such an upheaval in order to
have a shot at expropriating the other 49% of the population. This has been the
122

See Weyl, supra note.

49

source of many violent regime changes: Pinochet overthrew Allende for trying to
use democracy to achieve radical redistribution; 123 many of Hitler’s supporters
voted for the Nazis because they feared the redistributive threat posed by a
growing Communist party. 124 This is clearly inefficient as it converts the
redistribution that democracy creates into an aggregate loss of efficiency. The
prospect of such an upheaval, on the other hand, will further reinforce the
tendency of QV to select, among all efficient social decisions, the one that
minimizes the maximum loss any individual receives relative to the status quo.
QV thus seems more likely to be stable against violent overthrow than is majority
rule.
G. Other Objections to QV and Responses
The taboo against vote-buying. Vote-buying is illegal in democratic
countries. Indeed, there is a taboo against it. As we are painfully aware, any
suggestion that vote-buying should be legalized will be met with incredulity.
However, it is important to understand the source of the taboo, and to see why it
does not apply to QV.
As we explained in Part I, in a system of one-person-one-vote majority
rule, such as ours, vote-buying would not improve outcomes. Instead, it would
give excessive influence to people with the strongest preferences, and favor the
rich. Thus, there is good reason to outlaw vote-buying in a regular system of
majority rule. By contrast, the type of vote-buying that takes place in QV does
produce optimal social outcomes, taking into account variations in the intensity of
preferences as well as the number of people who hold particular preferences, and
it does not favor the rich relative to the status quo system. In fact, under QV it
would still be necessary to outlaw extra-system vote buying that could be used to
undermine the quadratic nature of costs by allowing one individual to buy votes
as a proxy for another.
It is useful to draw analogies to other settings in which markets are not
allowed to develop. For example, there is a taboo against the sale of human
organs to people who need transplants. Instead, a complicated system based on
need is used. 125 But these taboos must be evaluated on their own merits. Debra
Satz, for example, opposes markets in human organs because she believes that
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those markets harm the poor. 126 But QV should help the poor relative to the
current voting system. Others believe that certain norms against buying and
selling shouldn’t be disturbed because they reflect important human values. But
vote-buying is permitted in the corporate setting, 127 which suggests that the
prohibition on vote-buying does not reflect some intrinsic moral constraint but
instead advances specific institutional values that vary by context. This is, in fact,
straightforward. Voting is just a procedure that takes place in a larger institutional
context that enables a group to make collectively beneficial decisions. If votebuying advances the well-being of the group, then it should be permissible.
Voting and irrationality. Many have argued that because individuals have
such a tiny chance of being pivotal in elections it is irrational for individuals to
vote. 128 The argument we provided for the optimality of QV depends on voter
rationality. One might therefore wonder whether majority rule might not be better
than QV in dealing with such irrationality.
In fact, voter irrationality is not a problem for QV as long as the
irrationality is approximately uniform across individuals—more specifically, is
not correlated with the utility that they gain from different laws or projects.
Suppose, for example, that people generally overestimate the probability of being
pivotal, or vote for reasons unrelated to the specific gains from an election such as
a sense of civic duty. These factors will raise the number of votes bought by most
individuals, but maintain the proportionality between vote bought and utility so
long as they operate in a reasonable manner that is uncorrelated with utility.
Irrationality would produce problems for QV only if (for example) people who
gain more from a political outcome systematically overestimate (or
underestimate) their probability of being pivotal while people who gain less from
the political outcome do the opposite. As far as we know, there is no evidence for
such patterns.
In fact, under almost all of the standard models political scientists use to
explain voter turnout, QV actually performs better when voters are not perfectly
rational than when they are. The approximate efficiency of QV becomes even
more accurate as more voters participate. Recall that the only way QV can lead to
an inefficient outcome is that a very extreme individual decides to “buy the whole
126
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election.” This is only possible because other individuals, confident in the victory
of the socially optimal outcome, do not buy many votes. However if individuals
irrationally buy a large number of votes, the threat of such an extreme spoiler
vanishes, as it becomes too expensive for her to attempt to steal the election.
Meanwhile, while irrationality may explain why people vote as often as
they do under a system of majority rule, it cannot justify majority rule relative to
QV. Voter irrationality will increase the amount of voting but not stop majorities
from expropriating from minorities.
Credit constraints. We have argued above that the willingness of the rich
to pay for a dollar is not greater than the willingness of the poor to pay for a dollar
and thus redistribution from the poor to the rich would not be a plausible outcome
under QV. But, one might argue, the rich are more able to afford to pay for votes
in the short term. Even if the willingness of the poor to pay is the same or greater,
they might be unable to get access to the cash in the short-run.
The logic of the square function, however, not only makes this false, but
actually reverses the logic. Suppose that there is an issue up for a vote favored by
one person and opposed by 99 that would bring a benefit to the one person of $99
million and a harm to the 99 people of $1 million each. Suppose further that,
without the bill passing, the lifetime income of the beneficiary is $100 million
dollars and the lifetime income of those harmed is $1 million each. Thus one
might think that the “poor” would have a hard time raising the cash: they are
being asked to decide on a project that could deprive them of their lifetime
wealth!
However, it is easy to see things are quite the reverse. In this case the
chance that a marginal vote is pivotal will be roughly 4 thousandths of a
percent. 129 This leads the beneficiary to want to buy about 2200 votes in favor and
the opponents to want to buy 22 votes against each. This would cost the
proponent about $5 million and the opponents $500 each. $5 million is 5% of the
lifetime income of the proponent while $500 is 5 one-hundredths of a percent of
the lifetime income of each of the opponents. It seems wildly implausible that it
would be harder for each of these individuals to come up with $500 than it would
be for the proponent to come up with $5 million. If, because individuals were
irrational, they perceived a greater chance of their being pivotal, the calculation
would be even more lopsided.
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Frivolous voting. One might be concerned that the redistribution under
QV could give people an incentive to propose frivolous projects in order to force
votes and benefit from the redistribution. Suppose, for example, that a person
proposes that Illinois be sold to China. If the proposer does not vote, while others
vote (presumably) against the proposal, the proposer will collect a share of the
money spent for the votes. This would be possible in principle if anyone were
allowed to put anything on the ballot. But that would not be a sensible way to set
an agenda for QV votes. The system we instead propose is one where items are
not placed up for votes unless they have sufficient support, the same way a
referendum does not go forward onto a ballot unless it has collected sufficient
signatures. Support under QV, however, would be judged not by the number of
signatures but by the total willingness-to-pay to see the initiative on the ballot, as
gauged by a QV initiative process.
In particular, individuals could cast as many votes as they want in support
of the petition, paying the square of the number of votes they cast. The funds thus
given would be transferred on to votes for the initiative if it made it onto the
ballot. The item would be put up for a vote only if some support threshold were
reached, say, 1% of the population in votes. This would ensure that no one could
benefit by forcing others to vote on an issue; they could only get an item on the
ballot by committing funds, which they would then be forced to pay.

Conclusion
Constitutional designers have struggled, with only limited success, to
create political institutions that advance the common good. Authoritarian and
oligarchic systems give a dictator or ruling class the responsibility of acting for
the benefit of all, but fail to advance the public good because the individual or
elite has no incentives—other than the fear of revolution—to do so. Democracy
provides a method for the majority to influence outcomes directly, but it has never
solved the problem of how to account for the varying intensity of preferences.
Because majorities—both entrenched and temporary—can outvote minorities
with intense preferences, democratic outcomes can cause more harm than good,
and can lead to conflict and political disruption.
Various efforts to respond to this problem by using different voting rules
or subjecting majority voting to constraints create additional problems.
Supermajority rules, including bicameralism, cause gridlock, which harms
everyone. Judicial enforcement of rights can block good outcomes as well as bad
outcomes. The most successful countries have worked around institutional
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limitations, using logrolling and campaign finance, for example, but these
workarounds are themselves costly, imperfect, and controversial.
We have argued that QV provides a third way. It allows political
institutions to aggregate preferences both across number of people and intensity
of preferences. It thus should lead to better outcomes and less conflict. We doubt
that wholesale replacement of political institutions with QV will occur anytime
soon, but do believe that QV has enough promise that policymakers should
consider experimenting with it in carefully controlled settings, as we have begun
to do for smaller-scale group decisions.
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